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ARTICLES
THE BUSINESS LAWYER AS TERRORIST
TRANSACTION COST ENGINEER
Royce de R. Barondes°
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers have garnered a reputation for being unreasonable and
excessively contentious.' This popular sentiment is embedded in our
culture. If lawyers cannot change that perception, a second-best
outcome (from the perspective of lawyers) would be the formation of
an understanding that there is a reason why they appear to act
unreasonably, that it can be desirable for lawyers to act in a way that
initially appears to be unreasonable. This Article attempts to build a
basis for that understanding in the context of lawyers participating in
large commercial transactions.
To provide a specific context for the discussion, consider a
negotiation strategy occasionally adopted by counsel2 in a leveraged
lease of an aircraft to a large airline.' Typically in such a transaction,
. Assistant Professor, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia. J.D.,
University of Virginia; S.M. & S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prior
drafts of this paper were presented at the annual conferences of the Academy of
Legal Studies in Business (1998) and the Canadian Law and Economics Assocation
(1999). The author wishes to acknowledge the diligent research assistance of Ryan
Mulhearn, Hayley Riddle and Heidel Schneider. Funding was provided by the
Council on Research, Summer Stipend Program, at Louisiana State University (the
author's former employer).
1. See generally Robert A. Wenke, The Art of Negotiation for Lawyers 86 (1985)
("[M]any business people view attorneys as deal killers."); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert
H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers
in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 510-11 (1994) [hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents] ("Today, the dominant popular view is that lawyers
magnify the inherent divisiveness of dispute resolution."); G. Pascal Zachary, As
Asian Assets Dive, The Bargain Hunters Move in for the Killings, Wall St. J., June 22,
1998, at Al (describing a portion of a transaction negotiation as follows: -By now, [a
participant] thinks the lawyers are holding things up. 'Just get rid of them, put me
and [another participant] in a room and we'll have a deal in an hour,' he boasts.").
2. This strategy was articulated to the author by an experienced Wall Street
lawyer as a strategy that was, for ethical reasons, not to be emulated.
3. See Robert P. Davis, Leveraged Leasing of Capital Equipment. A Practical
Guide to Negotiating Certain Non-Tax Issues from the Lessee's Perspective, in
Leveraged Leasing 1987, at 35 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 423, 1987).
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an airline's contractual right to purchase an aircraft is assigned to a
trustee. The trustee acquires the funds to purchase the aircraft by
issuing debt interests to "debt participants" and equity interests to
"equity participants." Financial institutions, such as banks and
insurance companies, purchase these interests.4 The trustee enters
into a long-term lease of the aircraft with the airline. The terms of the
lease are of crucial importance to both the debt and equity
participants, because the lessor's rights under that lease circumscribe
their rights.
One important issue addressed by the lease will be the locations to
which the aircraft may be flown,5 because the return to the debt and
equity participants may be substantially and adversely affected if the
aircraft is located in certain countries. For example, the presence of
the aircraft in some countries may increase the likelihood of a casualty
to the aircraft. Alternatively, its location in other countries,6 or the
registration of the aircraft in another country,7 may restrict the ability
of the trustee to obtain possession of the aircraft after a default.
Consequently, the debt and equity participants will seek to include in
the lease restrictions on the locations to which the aircraft may be
flown.
Paradigmatic of the type of "unreasonable" action giving rise to the
popular perception of lawyers would be the insertion, by counsel for
the airline, of the following facially innocuous lease provision: "The
lessee may re-register the aircraft only in a 'permitted country.' For
this purpose, 'permitted country' means a country that has signed the
Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft."'
This provision, on its face, appears appropriate. A lessor would
appear to have a "right" in an aircraft under the lease. A superficial
understanding of the proposal would lull counsel to the debt or equity
participants into eliding the full import of the provision. However, the
value of rights under a convention is ephemeral if the rights cannot be
practicably realized in the country in question. For example, a
4. One describes the lease as "leveraged," because the issuance of debt leverages
the equity participant's ownership of the equity interest in the aircraft.
5. See Ronald M. Bayer et al., Lease Documentation Outline, in Equipment
Leasing-Leveraged Leasing, app. A at 1281, 1307 (Bruce E. Fritch et al. eds., 3d ed.
1988).
6. See generally Ian Shrank & Bruce E. Fritch, Leveraged Leasing, in Equipment
Leasing-Leveraged Leasing, supra note 5, at 99, 274-75 (discussing the Convention
for International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft).
7. See, e.g., Ian Shrank et al., Sample Leveraged Lease Documents, in Equipment
Leasing 1989, app. 5 at 991, 1007 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 515, 1989) (permitting re-registration of a subleased aircraft only in an
"Eligible Country" in which, inter alia, the local laws do not provide a "disability" to
the exercise of the trustee's rights under the indenture).
8. See Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, opened
for signature June 19, 1948,4 U.S.T. 1830, 310 U.N.T.S. 151.
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country, such as Iraq,9 could be a signatory, but the convention may
not afford the lessor the rights that it anticipated. Additionally, the
existence of the rights does not ameliorate any risk of destruction of
the aircraft.
Of course, the parties could expressly and knowingly agree that the
airline would be permitted to relocate and re-register the aircraft in
Iraq. But one suspects such an agreement would not be reached were
the parties to negotiate explicitly about the matter.
For U.S. carriers and debt and equity participants, it seems highly
likely that the "direct" benefit to the airline of having the right to take
these acts would be small, relative to the cost to the debt and equity
participants of agreeing to a lease that gives the airline that rightY,
The proposal of a contract term that appears innocuous but has a
latent impact that would not have been agreed upon had the
negotiations addressed the issue more directly, is a form of
negotiation that provides one basis on which lawyers can be
categorized as unreasonable. This type of negotiation tactic-
providing the latent allocation of rights and duties-is common and
persistent, and one reason patterns of commercial behavior persist is
that they are efficient. The persistence of this type of negotiation may
indicate that it provides benefits that are not obvious. - Perhaps this
manner of negotiation increases the aggregate value to the parties of
the transaction being negotiated in some indirect fashion.
This type of negotiation strategy could also persist merely because
9. See id. (adherence of Iraq deposited Jan. 14, 1981, 22 I..M. 1224 (1983)).
10. Consider, in the alternative, a major U.S. airline that owned its aircraft
outright. If the airline were required to pay separately for the right to fly the aircraft
to, and re-register it in, Iraq, the airline likely would be willing to pay very little, or
nothing, for that right. In this sense, the right to relocate and re-register the aircraft in
Iraq has little "direct" benefit to the airline.
11. Excessively vigorous negotiation techniques are particularly prevalent in the
largest cities. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Law.ver's Obligation To Be
Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L Rev. 181, 193 (1981)
("At one extreme lies the 'rural God-fearing standard,' so exacting and tedious that it
often excludes the use of lawyers. At the other extreme stands 'New York hardball,'
now played in most larger cities using the wall-to-wall indenture for a playing
surface.").
12 Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 535 (4th ed. 1992)
("[T]he implicit economic content of the common law... may seem straightforward
with regard to those areas-contracts mainly, but also large stretches of property and
torts-where transaction costs are low. In such areas, inefficient rules of law %ill be
nullified by express agreement of the parties, while persistent judicial defiance of
economic logic will simply induce contracting parties to substitute private arbitration
for judicial resolution of contract disputes.... If courts refused to enforce the
efficiency criterion in [areas where there is no voluntary relationship between the
disputants] ... the likely consequence would be legislative preemption of a major
sphere of judicial autonomy-the fashioning of common law rules and doctrines.");
Paul H. Rubin, Business Firms and the Common Law 5 (1983) (suggesting that a bias
in favor of re-litigating inefficient legal rules produces efficient common law legal
rules).
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it results in the allocation to one party of a greater share of the
transaction's aggregate value, an amount sufficient to compensate that
party for a decrease in the aggregate value of the transaction as a
whole. Or, more colloquially, the portion of the pie (representing the
aggregate transaction value) taken by the party who benefits from
that negotiation strategy increases, even if the total size of the pie is
diminished.
A third possible rationale for the persistence of this negotiation
strategy could be the presence of unreasonable lawyers as an artifact
of path dependence. 3 That is, even if the use of unreasonable lawyers
would not be efficient if one could unilaterally impose an alternative
on the relevant community, the manner in which transactional
practice has developed could prevent a transition to a more efficient
alternative.
If this type of negotiation were always inefficient, one would expect
reputational factors to permit the achievement of a more efficient
outcome. This outcome should occur particularly in the largest
commercial transactions involving the best known law firms in large
cities. In these transactions, the frequency of interaction should
facilitate dissemination of reputations. Of course, it is not obvious
that reputational factors could eliminate all substantially inefficient
bargaining strategies. Opportunism may persist if there is an
insufficient number of interactions to permit reputations to be
adequately formed or if mechanisms to propagate reputations are
inadequate. 4
In summary, although the persistence of a negotiation strategy that
proposes latent contractual terms that would not necessarily have
been agreed upon otherwise raises the question of whether it is
efficient, its persistence does not conclusively demonstrate that it is.
This Article argues that contractual relationships created by this
negotiation strategy can be efficient based on the concept of a
13. Recent scholarship has argued that, in some contexts, path dependence can
cause inefficient outcomes to persist. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347, 348, 365-66 (1996) (describing
"standardization" as "a form of path dependence"); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 643-44 (1996).
14. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate
Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 579
(1989) [hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age]. David Charny notes that a
firm may enhance the extent to which concerns for its reputation restrain
opportunism by making investments to develop its reputation. See David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 400 (1990)
[hereinafter Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions] (discussing manufacturers). He also argues
that the participation of a union in labor negotiations can cause the parties to be
"repeat player[s]," increasing the significance of the employer's reputation. See id. at
418.
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"hostage" developed by Oliver E. Williamson.'- Williamson argues
that opportunistic behavior by one party to a contractual relationship
can be reduced through a "credible commitment" effected by the
delivery of a hostage. 6 Part I briefly outlines the use of hostages in
contractual relationships. This Part reviews the value provided by
hostages and presents alternative solutions to opportunism, such as
the use of vague contractual undertakings.
One limitation of the use of hostages to restrain opportunism is that
the context of a transaction may not provide an obvious hostage. Part
II examines how lawyers create hostages in the form of unreasonable
contractual rights that limit future opportunistic behavior. One
criterion a hostage must meet, if it is to be efficacious, is the hostage
must have little value to the hostage-holder other than deterrence of
the other party's opportunism. 7 If the holder of a hostage can gain
value by diverting the hostage to its own use, the delivery of that
hostage may reduce opportunism by the delivering party, only to
increase opportunism by the party taking the hostage. Ultimately,
that resolution would not provide a solution to potential opportunism,
thereby eliminating the benefit derived from such an exchange. This
Part argues that contract provisions that may appear to be
unreasonable are, in fact, well suited to performing the function of a
hostage.
Part II additionally reviews the mechanics by which commercial
transactions are negotiated, noting that there are costs arising from
the negotiation of hostages. These costs can arise where the taking of
a hostage sends a false signal to the other party, indicating
uncooperative behavior or mistrust. These signals may prevent
contract formation or may othervise increase the costs of contracting.
This Part proposes taking a "hidden" contractual right (or hostage)-
taking a hostage from a party who is not aware that it has provided a
hostage. 8 Such actions may avoid the increased negotiation costs that
result from the negotiation of hostages.
Parts III, IV and V examine implications of this negotiation
strategy. Part III reviews the impact of this strategy on lawyers'
reputations. This Part argues that one consequence of the adoption of
15. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitnents: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 522-26 (1983) [hereinafter Williamson, Credible
Commitments] (discussing "The Hostage Model").
16. Id. at 519. One example of such a hostage would be a supplier's location of a
factory close to the customer. See id. at 526.
17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
18. Those who unilaterally take hostages are generally labeled "terrorists." For
this reason, lawyers who seek to increase joint transaction value-those described as
"transaction cost engineers"-by unilaterally seizing hostages can be identified as
"terrorist transaction cost engineers." See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale LJ. 239, 255 (1984)
(coining the term "transaction cost engineer").
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negotiation strategies involving the acquisition of hidden contractual
hostages is a negative accretion in lawyers' reputations.
Part IV reviews selected principles of contract law and their impact
on the ability to create hidden contractual rights.19 If the creation of
hidden contractual hostages can increase transaction value, that fact
has implications on the selection of contract construction rules.
As discussed in Part IV, certain principles of contract construction,
and certain defenses to the enforcement of a contract, limit the ability
of lawyers to seize hidden contractual hostages. These principles and
defenses not only limit the ability of transactional lawyers who
identify risks to allocate these risks by contract but also decrease the
incentive for a lawyer to identify contingent risks during contract
negotiations. Part V examines the implications of this decreased
incentive on lawyer conduct.
I. USE OF HOSTAGES TO LIMIT OPPORTUNISM
A. Opportunism in Contract Performance
The potential value the granting of a hostage may provide to a
commercial relationship derives from the extent to which that
mechanism may restrain opportunism.2" The value that may be
provided by hostages thus depends on both the reasons why
opportunism arises and the alternative mechanisms used to restrain it.
19. Alan Schwartz asserts that courts more frequently interpret contract terms
literally in relational contexts, on the basis that an inability of the parties to have fully
specified the terms that should govern their relationships is related to an inability of a
court, ex post, to determine the appropriate risk allocations. See Alan Schwartz,
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 271-74 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Relational
Contracts]. Part IV does not purport to provide a theme that rationalizes decided
cases, as does Schwartz; rather it is confined to articulating the impact of various rules
of interpretation on the ability to take hidden contractual hostages.
20. Opportunism arises where "a performing party behaves contrary to the other
party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the
performer." Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
Minn. L. Rev. 521, 521 (1981). Although this definition is sufficient for purposes of
this Article, there are a number of alternative formulations. One alternative involves
an expanded definition: "Contractual opportunism generally involves a party's
attempt to capture a greater share of the return on a contract. Sometimes this self-
aggrandizement is condemned because it reduces the joint return on a contract; other
times, it is condemned because it violates contract-based expectations." Mark P.
Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997, 1002 (1992)
[hereinafter Gergen, Open Terms]. Another provides the following discussion: "The
term 'opportunism' has no precise definition but is a word often used by economists
to denote what most people would call unethical or crafty behavior." G. Richard
Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases:
An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198, 1199 n.5 (1988) [hereinafter
Shell, Ethical Standards]. Posner states, "This example shows that another name for
opportunism is-monopoly." Posner, supra note 12, at 92.
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The potential for opportunism arises in circumstances where the
parties cannot feasibly envision all possible future circumstances that
might have an impact on the performance to be rendered and
therefore do not expressly and knowingly incorporate in their
agreements practicably enforceable provisions pertaining to the rights
and duties in those circumstances. The potential for opportunistic
contract performance is pervasive, as commercial contracts frequently
will be incomplete.
A contract may be incomplete in two main ways. First, a contract
may clearly assign applicable rights and duties. Nevertheless, that
contract can be considered incomplete if the particular circumstances
in which performance is to be rendered were not expressly
contemplated by the parties during the negotiation of the contract and
the circumstances that do occur are materially different from those
that were contemplated when the contract was formed.?
Alternatively, a contract may not specify the rights and duties
applicable in a future state that arises.? Both forms of incompleteness
may be illustrated with simple examples.
The first type of incompleteness frequently arises in commercial
leases involving percentage rent. A commercial lease may provide for
rent calculated, in part, based on the tenant's income from the
premises. The tenant under such a lease may take a number of
actions that decrease the variable portion of the rent: it may open a
competing store at a nearby location, 4 change the nature of the
21. See Wenke, supra note 1, at 92; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism 178 (1985) [hereinafter Williamson, Capitalism]; Randy E.
Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L Rev.
821, 821 (1992); Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value
Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74
Or. L. Rev. 189, 212-13 (1995) [hereinafter Bernstein, Law & Economics]; David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1819 (1991) [hereinafter Charny, Hypothetical Bargains]; Gilson
& Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at 517 n.23; Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L Rev. 608, 609 (1998);
Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain
Principle, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 1129, 1138 (1986); Williamson, Credible Commitments,
supra note 15, at 527.
22. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L
Rev. 261,270 (1985) ("When a contract fails to provide for a contingency, unintended
results may occur.... Note that contractual instructions, although incomplete, may
nonetheless specify a perfectly well-defined and clear result for each
contingency .... ); cf. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 19, at 272 (asserting
that courts occasionally supply additional terms to contracts that appear facially
complete).
23. See, e.g., Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 19, at 272 (articulating a
similar dichotomy by describing a contract as being incomplete where either it -has a
true gap-for example, no price term-or... partitions future states or potential
contracting partners 'too coarsely').
24. See id. at 275.
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business activities undertaken at the demised premises,25 or vacate the
premises.26  For example, in Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc. ,27 a firm
operating a supermarket vacated its leased premises, for which it was
obligated to pay rent equal to the greater of a fixed amount or 1.5% of
gross sales, and moved to a nearby location.2 The tenant refused to
terminate the lease, and the premises remained vacant.29 The tenant,
in refusing to terminate the lease, may have sought to limit its
competition by preventing the location of a competing business in its
former premises.
No express contractual provisions afforded the landlord a remedy;
the actions of the tenant conformed with the literal terms of the
contract. 0 The landlord, however, successfully argued the existence
of an implied covenant to pay a "reasonable and adequate rent to the
lessors during the time the lessee chose not to operate its supermarket
on the premises."'31 Thus, a contract may be considered incomplete
where it provides for rights and duties but does not expressly modify
those rights and duties (or reaffirm their application) in unforeseen
circumstances, or circumstances that were foreseen but disregarded,
that subsequently arise.
A contract also may be incomplete by failing to provide for the
rights and duties applicable in a circumstance that does arise. An
example of such a contract would be one calling for the payment, at a
future time, in a currency of a government not in existence at the time
performance becomes due.32
25. See, e.g., Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775,778, 781 (Cal. 1955)
(stating, in a case where the tenant changed the use of the property from a sales
location to a storage location, a trial court finding that the minimum rental "was not a
substantial and adequate minimum rent to be paid in lieu of a percentage of the sales
is a sufficient basis for a determination that Sears[, the tenant,] impliedly covenanted
to use the demised premises for the sale of merchandise").
26. See, e.g., College Block v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1376, 1379,
1383 (1988) (holding, in a case in which the tenant ceased operating a gas station on
the premises, that a covenant of continued operation will be implied only if the
guaranteed minimum is "not substantial" and does not "provide [the landlord] with a
fair return on its investment").
27. 643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho 1982).
28. See id. at 1080-81.
29. See id. at 1080.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 1085. Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 617 P.2d 704, 706-07 (Wash. 1980)
(en banc), involved a similar pattern in which a tenant vacated premises formerly
used for a supermarket and moved to a nearby location. The lease provided for rent
equal to the greater of a fixed amount or 1.5% of gross sales and granted the tenant
the unconditional right to sublease the premises. See id. at 706, 710. The tenant
subleased the property to an Asian grocery and import business. See id. at 707. The
court held that there was no implied limitation on the tenant's right to sublease the
premises, and therefore, the tenant was not required to sublease the property only to
a sublessee generating comparable gross sales. See id. at 710-11.
32. See, e.g., Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. 1, 14 (1868) (holding a party "entitled to
be paid in ... Confederate dollars can recover their actual value at the time and place
of the contract, in lawful money of the United States").
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The factors that result in incomplete contracts, even in highly
negotiated transactions, are familiar. The limitations of language
permit the plausible assertion that any but the most simple contract is
ambiguous in some regard.3 3 Different language conventions within
particular groups can introduce more ambiguity. Additionally, an
incomplete contract may be knowingly accepted in order to cut costs.34
In many contracts, particularly those calling for performance to be
rendered a material amount of time in the future, the costs of
negotiating the express allocation of all possible material risks,
including remote risks, may be prohibitive.35  Moreover, the
contracting parties may be unaware of many of the events that may
materially affect the nature and value of the performance of a
contract.
When parties to highly negotiated commercial transactions are
negotiating contracts, it is understood that circumstances not
adequately addressed in their contracts may arise. In such cases, a
variety of mechanisms are used by parties at the contract formation
stage to limit opportunistic conduct during contract performance. If
both parties are in a position to act opportunistically, they could
attempt to require simultaneous performance.- The possibility that
opportunistic behavior would be met with opportunistic behavior
could, in such circumstances, result in cooperative behavior. For
transactions not conducive to simultaneous performance, the parties
may segment the performance of each into smaller increments,
creating a transaction-specific reputation that could limit
33. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp.
116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), cited in Avery Katz, The Strategic Stncture of Offer and
Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L Rev. 215,
222 n.21 (1990) (detailing a dispute over whether a contract for the sale of -chicken"
included "stewing chicken"); Shell, Ethical Standards, supra note 20, at 1227
(discussing Homsi v. C. H. Babb Co., 409 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1980), in which a
seller of an oven agreed to provide the purchaser with the "necessary gas"). The
appellate court in Homsi affirmed a trial court's finding that the seller's failure to
disclose in the contract that the term "gas" meant propane gas was actionable as a
deceptive practice under Massachusetts law, where the seller knew that the term
would be interpreted by the buyer to mean natural gas, which was significantly less
expensive. See Homsi, 409 N.E.2d at 223-24.
34. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement 155-
56 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the benefits of "constructive ambiguity"); Wenke, supra
note 1, at 92-93 (indicating that ambiguity may be necessary if an agreement is to be
reached).
35. See, eg., Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstnction of Contracts,
71 Ind. L.J. 45, 52 n.51 (1995) [hereinafter Gergen, Defense]; Schwartz, Relational
Contracts, supra note 19, at 278-80 ("In sum, contracts can be incomplete because of
(1) the inevitable limitations of language, (2) party inadvertence, (3) the costs of
creating contract terms, (4) asymmetric information, and (5) a preference on one side
of the transaction for anonymity (that is, pooling).").
36. See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 Vand. L Rev. 221, 253
(1991) [hereinafter Shell, Opportunism].
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opportunism. The parties also can attempt to build into the contract a
mechanism by which their performance is monitored on an ongoing
basis.
Where these solutions are not available, the parties can instead
agree to a vague standard limiting opportunism. For example, one
party could agree to use its "best efforts" or "reasonable best efforts"
in performing a specified contractual obligation. Or a party may
merely rely on an appropriate resolution to be provided by a generally
applicable principle of contract law,37 such as the implied covenant of
good faith38 or a defense such as impracticability39 or mistake.40
This approach to restricting opportunism also has limitations. The
application of such provisions to a specific factual pattern can be
uncertain.41 Even if the parties can detect opportunistic behavior that
should be proscribed by one of these nebulous contractual provisions,
the victim may be unable to produce evidence adequate to cause a
judicial determination in its favor in any resulting litigation.42 This
uncertainty can increase costs by producing increased litigation arising
from the indeterminacy of the application of deliberately ambiguous
language to a specific factual pattern.43
B. Value of Hostages in Restraining Opportunism
An alternative mechanism used to restrain one party's opportunism
in the performance of an incomplete contract involves the delivery of
37. Cf. Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 93 (identifying a similarity between
nebulous contractual undertakings, such as one calling for "best efforts", and
doctrines that excuse performance).
38. See U.C.C. § 1-203, 1 U.L.A. 109 (master ed. 1989); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 (1981).
39. See U.C.C. § 2-615, 1B U.L.A. 195; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261.
A party to a highly negotiated and documented transaction is unlikely to rely on
doctrines of contract interpretation and enforcement to provide a suitable risk
allocation, and omit an express contractual allocation, where the risk is material and
not remote, and the application of the doctrine to the particular factual pattern is
uncertain. See Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 54-55 (discussing impracticability).
40. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 151-158.
41. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at 518-19
(discussing nebulous contract provisions); cf. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 115, 136 (1993)
(stating, concerning the principle that contractual gaps should be filled with the
provisions the parties would have supplied, that "[a] growing consensus among
economic analysts suggests that finding the efficient market-mimicking default rule is
a great deal more difficult than Posner had imagined when he developed his theory").
42. Cf. Roland Kirstein & Dieter Schmidtchen, Judicial Detection Skill and
Contractual Compliance, 17 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 509, 512-19 (1997) (providing a
model of contracting in an environment incorporating incomplete judicial detection
skills).
43. For similar reasons, uncertainty as to the content of legal rules can prevent
efficient business planning. See Shell, Ethical Standards, supra note 20, at 1242
("Clear rules allow businesspeople to better plan future economic activity.").
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a hostage by that party.' Parties to commercial relationships have
adopted this mechanism to restrain opportunism in a variety of
contexts.45
In one view of secured lending arrangements, the granting of rights
to repossess collateral provides the lender with the ability to disrupt
all or a portion of the debtor's business, and this arrangement deters
opportunistic behavior by the debtor." Excessively stringent bank
loan covenants can perform a similar function."
The examples are not limited to commercial lending, however. A
provision in a franchise agreement permitting the franchisor to
terminate the agreement at will constitutes another example of such a
hostage.' The possibility that the franchisor may terminate the
franchise, and the resulting loss to the franchisee of its investments in
building goodwill for the franchise, imposes incentives on the
franchisee to operate the franchise in a fashion that contributes to the
positive reputation of the franchisor and other franchises.
Margaret F. Brinig identified a particularly memorable example of
hostage delivery that involves the historical development of the
custom of delivering engagement rings.49 She notes that this custom
became more prevalent in the period between the two world wars at a
time when states were abolishing the cause of action for breach of a
contract to marry.' She states that during the period,
[A] woman was expected to remain chaste until the time of her
engagement. Once she was betrothed, however, sexual intimacy
with her fianc6 reportedly occurred nearly half the time. All this
was well and good, but if the marriage never came about, she was
irretrievably barred from offering an unblemished self to a new
suitor and suffered a loss in "market value." 51
Thus, in her view, the delivery of the ring served as an extra-legal
substitute for the disappearing contract-based cause of action.5
Other examples include "earnest money" deposits, such as deposits
in typical contracts for the sale of real estate, 3 excessive liquidated
44. See Williamson, Credible Corninnents, supra note 15, at 527.
45. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (detailing how a decision about
plant location can be used to restrain opportunism).
46. See Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 Cornell L Rev.
1436,1448-52 (1997).
47. Cf. Bernstein, Law & Economics, supra note 21, at 223 (describing these
covenants as being accompanied by an unenforceable undertaking by the lender not
to enforce the covenants unreasonably).
48. See id. at 218-20; Muris, supra note 20, at 576-77; Williamson, Credible
Commitments, supra note 15, at 529.
49. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L Econ. & Org. 203, 203-04
(1990).
50. See id at 205.
51. Id (citations and footnote omitted).
52. See id. at 211.
53. See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L Rev. 531, 537
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damages; 4 lower wages paid to employees in the early years of
employment, accompanied by higher levels in later years;55 and
provisions in commercial leases obligating tenants to pay for
improvements. 6
Yet there is an important distinction to be drawn among these
hostages. The retention of a hostage may not be a zero sum event.
The benefit to the holder of the hostage from not returning the
hostage may not be equal to the detriment suffered by the party who
relinquished the hostage, and, in fact, varies according to the type of
hostage involved. It is not novel to note that, on this basis, one can
distinguish, for example, the hostage inherent in secured lending from
the hostage elements of deposits in real estate contracts, excessive
liquidated damages and, in some contexts, the termination of a
franchise. Additionally, one can distinguish hostages whose seizure
requires judicial process, 7 such as excessive liquidated damages
provisions."
For example, the value to a creditor of the assets seized upon
exercise of a security interest frequently will be less than the value of
the assets to the debtor.59 It will be costly for a bank to sell assets
seized upon exercise of a security interest. And a debtor's loss of its
tangible assets may divest it of goodwill that cannot be realized by the
secured party in a subsequent sale of the collateral. Thus, the value to
a creditor realized by exercising a security interest may be less,
sometimes substantially less, than the diminution in value incurred by
the debtor. A lender's exercise of its rights in the collateral may be a
"negative sum" event. One might call such a hostage, in which the
direct value of the hostage to the hostage-taker is less than the value
of the hostage to the other party, a "negative sum" hostage.
Hostages in the form of cash do not have this negative sum
characteristic. The hostage-taker essentially acquires the value that
the party granting the hostage has relinquished. One could
(1995).
54. See Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 61-62 (questioning the efficacy of this
form of hostage).
55. See Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at 396 ("[Tjhe worker in his
early years posts a bond-in the form of 'uncompensated' labor-that the employer
returns to him if he holds his job into later years.").
56. See Bernstein, Law & Economics, supra note 21, at 219.
57. Cf. Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 62 (noting the decreased effectiveness
of bonds, the realization of which requires resort to judicial process).
58. Cf id. (arguing that excessive liquidated damages are "poor security for
performance").
59. See Scott, supra note 46, at 1457-58; cf. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash,
520 U.S. 953, 964-65 (1997) (valuing collateral in a cram down under 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5)(B) as the "cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same
'proposed ... use,"' as opposed to the value that would be obtained in a foreclosure
sale); Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at 407, 420-22 (discussing consumer
credit).
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characterize such a hostage as a "zero sum" hostage. Zero sum
hostages are not uncommon. A franchisor's right to terminate a
franchise at will could be a zero sum hostage if the franchisor can
capture the goodwill forfeited by the franchisee on termination of the
franchise.' Similarly, a long-term lender's right to accelerate a loan
could be essentially zero sum, or could become less negative sum, if
interest rates were to rise after a loan had been extended. In that
case, the lender's realization of less than the outstanding principal
amount could be offset, in whole or in part, by the ability to extend a
loan at a higher interest rate.61
This distinction between negative sum and zero sum hostages is
important in determining whether the taking of a hostage, to deter
opportunistic behavior by one party, creates incentives for the
hostage-taker to act opportunistically by improperly retaining the
hostage. The preferred type of hostage is significantly negative sum,
deterring opportunism by the party who grants the hostage while
providing no direct incentive for the hostage-taker to divert the
hostage to its own purposes. 2
Even with hostages that have no direct value when appropriated for
the purposes of the hostage-taker, there is some risk that the delivery
of a hostage will increase opportunism by the holder of the hostage.
For example, a lender could seek to extract a fee from a debtor in
exchange for not accelerating indebtedness, even if there were no
opportunity for the lender to extend credit to other potential
borrowers at a higher interest rate. But the sequence of "play" can
undermine the credibility of the threat.' Frequently, after the lender
makes the threat, there is no compelling reason to follow the
threatened course if the borrower does not pay the requested fee. For
the threat to be most effective, the lender would have to bind itself to
accelerating the loan-to killing the hostage-if the fee were not paid,
at a time when the borrower had not irrevocably determined whether
to pay the fee.'
60. See Bernstein, Law & Economics, supra note 21, at 120 n.87 (describing this
type of hostage as a "beautiful prince(ss)" (alteration in original)).
61. See Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of
Distressed Corporations, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 45, 51-59 (1998).
62- See Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at 406-07; Williamson, Credible
Commitments, supra note 15, at 526-27. This type of hostage poses the potential for a
net resource loss if the hostage is retained by the hostage-taker. See Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions, supra note 14, at 406. Thus, a significantly negative sum hostage could be
problematic if there were also a direct benefit to the hostage-taker from retaining the
hostage for its own purposes.
63. See generally Katz, supra note 33, at 235-37 (discussing rationality of
subgames).
64. But cf. David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall:
Retaining Lawyers to Bolster Credibility, 1 Harv. Negotiation L Rev. 65, 65-66, 74-75(1996) (arguing that a non-refundable retainer can bind a prospective plaintiff to
bringing a lawsuit and induce a settlement of a claim worth less than the cost to
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In this circumstance, the importance of a lender's reputation can
increase the likelihood of opportunism. A party who possesses a
hostage that provides no direct benefit upon its exercise could
nevertheless exercise the hostage to develop a reputation for doing so,
in order to extract gains in future transactions.65  One expects,
however, that activity would be tempered by the impact of that
reputation on the frequency of future transactions. Although those
already in contracts with that party may believe threats to retain
hostages, others contemplating entering into future transactions could
decide to avoid entering into a contract with such an unreasonable
party.' Alternatively, if the potential loss to the party who
relinquished the hostage were very large, one could envision that a
not otherwise credible threat to retain the hostage could nevertheless
influence that party's actions.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, even a substantially negative sum
hostage could give rise to opportunism by the party holding the
hostage. These various possible outcomes do not permit the
formulation of universally applicable conclusions. Hostages will
increase the joint value of a transaction in some circumstances, and
the consequential increase in the value of opportunism to the hostage-
taker in other circumstances will cause the delivery of a hostage to
decrease a transaction's joint value.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS
Part I discussed the value hostages can add to commercial
relationships by deterring opportunism. Negative sum hostages are
particularly useful, because they restrict opportunism by one party but
do not encourage, or encourage to a diminished extent, opportunism
by the other party. Part II reviews the environment of the negotiation
of substantial commercial transactions between sophisticated parties
represented by counsel. This Part also reviews the method by which
transactional lawyers in such a context further their clients' interests
by providing for the delivery of alternative forms of hostages.67
litigate the claim and that "[b]y sending some signal that she is aware of the tactic...
the plaintiff should be able to convince a rational defendant that settling before the
retainer is paid could be mutually beneficial").
65. Cf. Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at 407 (noting that lenders to
consumers may seize collateral to develop a "reputation for 'toughness' among
borrowers who might be tempted to default").
66. It is unlikely that a party who retains a hostage can limit the dissemination of
its reputation for retaining hostages to firms with which it already has business, while
preventing its transmission to mere potential contracting partners.
67. Excluded from this discussion are other transactions, such as those
memorialized in contracts of adhesion and transactions in which not all parties are
represented by counsel. These transactions raise other issues. See, e.g., Rex R.
Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 75, 91 (1985)
(indicating an unrepresented party may rely on the expertise of counsel representing
an opposing party).
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A. Elements of Negotiation
The use of hostages can add value in transactions that otherwise
could be infected by opportunism. But the nature of commercial
relationships restricts parties' abilities to negotiate for the provision of
hostages in transactions that could benefit from the delivery of
hostages.
A party's posture in negotiating a commercial contract can disclose
information concerning the manner in which that party will perform
its obligations. A confrontational posture during the negotiation may
signal that confrontation will also arise during the course of contract
performance. For example, some have argued that raising non-
financial issues during the bargaining process may signal a tendency
towards uncooperative action during contract performance.' In this
view, a concern for the language used to address non-financial issues
may indicate a party will seek to rely on the express terms of the
contract, as opposed to referencing the actions that maximize
collective welfare, to resolve issues arising during performance of the
contract.
Because complex commercial contracts generally cannot expressly
articulate the rights and duties that should pertain in all possible
future states,69 this signal can be of particular importance during the
negotiation of complex commercial contracts. Until a definitive
agreement is executed, parties negotiating a commercial contract are
frequently free to terminate pursuit of the prospective relationship. 0
68. See Bernstein, Law & Economics, supra note 21, at 229-30; Lisa Bernstein,
Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ. 59, 70-71 (1993)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Social Norms]; Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at
405 ("Negotiation may also create or intensify an adversarial atmosphere by raising
the specter of litigation for transactors who wish to view themselves as friends or
partners."); Korobkin, supra note 21, at 621; cf Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley
Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 Or. L. Rev. 239, 249-50 (1995) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Silicon Valley] ("[A Silicon Valley] lawyer noted, '[wjhen I deal with
lawyers in other parts of the country, they... will go crazy over a lot of stuff that
would just draw a yawn from a Silicon Valley law firm.' Because the post-deal
relationship between the entrepreneur and the fund is like a partnership, contentious
or prolonged pre-transaction negotiations that erode trust and goodwill may impose
particularly high costs on the parties.... [R]educing these types of 'attitudinal'
negotiating costs may also reduce the likelihood of transaction breakdown .... "
(third alteration in original)(footnotes omitted)); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for
Damage Measures, 100 Yale L. 369, 397 (1990) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Myth]
(arguing that parties may not seek to include contract provisions providing for the
reimbursement of the legal fees of the prevailing party in subsequent litigation,
because the request for such a provision sends a bad signal).
69. See generally supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing how failing
to consider potential future consequences can result in incomplete contracts).
70. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L Rev. 217 (1987)
(discussing the extent to which actions prior to execution of a definitive agreement
can result in contractual obligations).
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Consequently, signals indicating one party's performance will not be
cooperative may cause the other party to terminate the negotiations.'
Alternatively, a party receiving those signals may decide to continue
the negotiations but document the relationship more completely,
increasing the costs of negotiation for both parties.
Other commentators have noted the importance of building trust in
complex commercial negotiations.7" The process of building trust
during the negotiation of commercial contracts does not simply
involve avoiding the conveyance of certain signals addressing one's
own future actions. One party's negotiation of a commercial contract
also can signal the extent to which it trusts the other party. And the
two types of signals are interrelated.73 It is difficult for a party to build
trust while simultaneously taking actions that indicate mistrust of the
other party.
B. Impact of Seeking Hostages on Negotiations; Alternative Forms of
Hostages
The importance of trust in the negotiation of commercial contracts
affects a party's ability to negotiate expressly for the delivery of a
hostage, as a request for the delivery of a hostage signals an absence
of trust. This fact will affect the manner in which parties seek to
negotiate for hostages.
One common element in the negotiation of complex commercial
relationships is the discussion of the reasons underlying a party's
request for certain contractual rights. If a proposed term in a contract
adversely affects one party, it is natural for that party to seek to
identify the rationale underlying the term. An understanding of the
rationale can permit an alternative resolution to be reached, achieving
the same benefits at a lesser cost for the adversely affected party.
This understanding of the process of negotiation exposes a problem
with attempts to take hostages. A party seeking to take a hostage
must be prepared to provide a rationale for the requested provision.
Consider, for example, a secured lender providing the borrower with a
rationale for requesting a security interest.74 The lender could identify
71. See Bernstein, Law & Economics, supra note 21, at 230; Bernstein, Social
Norms, supra note 68, at 71; cf. Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (stating, in criticizing Lippo's interpretation of its
contract with Mobil, which Judge Posner found unreasonable: "It seems to me pretty
obvious that Mobil would never have agreed to such an application and that for Lippo
to have pressed for it would just have convinced Mobil of Lippo's unreliability and
have made the negotiations collapse.").
72. See Shell, Opportunism, supra note 36, at 252-53; Rose, supra note 53, at 531-
32.
73. Rose argues that parties who are monitored because they are not trusted may
behave less cooperatively by virtue of that monitoring. See Rose, supra note 53, at
540.
74. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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its mistrust of the borrower and its desire to punish the debtor if the
debtor misbehaves by either investing in excessively risky projects or
engaging in self-dealing, for example. But the articulation of this
rationale does not foster the building of trust in the relationship. That
response may result in the termination of the negotiations or an
increase in negotiation costs?5
A transactional lawyer has two methods by which he can seek to
diminish the adverse impact of a hostage request on the tenor of the
relationship between the parties. First, a transactional lawyer who
knows his client seeks to take a hostage can obfuscate the reason
underlying the request for the relevant contractual provision. For
example, he could indicate the provision in question is "standard" or
"customary," without articulating the intent to take a hostage. The
advantage of this reply is that, if true, it eliminates the secondary
signal inherent in the request for a particular contractual provision. If
all parties in the lender's position seek a particular contractual
provision, any lender's request for that provision provides no
information about the lender to the borrower.
A second method for diminishing the strength of the adverse signal
arising from seeking a hostage is more controversial. The lawyer may
seek to take a "latent" or "hidden" hostage. In this case, the lawyer
seizes the hostage without the knowledge of the party who has
relinquished it. Frequently, these hostages can be created by
providing an overinclusive contract provision. In such a case, counsel
drafts a provision that addresses one issue in a "reasonable" way but
expands the language so that it also addresses and allocates to the
other party, in an unreasonable, latent fashion, the risk of a second
contingency.
This method of seeking a hostage can tax the skill of a transactional
lawyer. The skillful drafting of the clause in question may cause
opposing counsel immediately to identify the issue that is addressed
reasonably and to overlook the other implications. Yet opposing
counsel may inquire as to the consequences of the provision. In that
circumstance, the lawyer seeking to seize the hidden hostage may
identify the benign rationale without raising the second consequence,
with the hope that the other counsel will not grasp the second
meaning.76 Artfulness frequently is required for success, because
75. In commercial loans, the borrower generally agrees to pay the counsel fees of
the lender. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Harris, Loan Agreement Among Specialty Steel
Company, Ina, Groveland International Distributions, Ibc., Wesley-Harding, Inc and
Megabank, N.A. § 12.04, in Drafting Commercial Documents Series 1996, at 159, 278
(Massachusetts Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., No. 96-04.15, 1996). Consequently, in
this case, the increased cost would be borne to a great extent by the borrower itself.
76. See generally Craver, supra note 34 at 411 ("In most instances.., selective
disclosures are expected by opponents and are considered an inherent aspect of
negotiation interactions."). If litigation arises concerning the process by which
contractual provisions were negotiated, the parties frequently vill be unable to
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direct misstatements may provide a fraud defense to the enforcement
of the contract,77 while the provision of a convoluted response, in
order to avoid making a fraudulent statement, may alert opposing
counsel to the need for greater review of the provision in question.
The methods by which counsel can seize a hidden contractual
hostage limit the range of possible hostages. For example, it would be
difficult for a lender to obtain an enforceable security interest without
the knowing assent of the borrower. The documentation
requirements are too stringent.
One example of such a hostage, however, is the provision that refers
to an international convention in defining the jurisdictions in which a
lessee may register an aircraft.78 This contractual provision could
operate as a "hidden" hostage. For example, an aircraft lease will
address various aspects of the lessee's use of the aircraft, including
maintenance requirements.79  During the term of the lease,
technological developments may obviate the need to perform certain
maintenance. Suppose that one such development during the term of
a lease could decrease maintenance costs by $500,000 without
adversely affecting the value of the aircraft at the end of the lease
term. Prudent debt and equity participants would not want the trust
agreement and the lease to authorize the trustee to agree to such a
modification without their consent.8° On the other hand, the trustee
recreate the history of the negotiations, although written comments delivered during
the negotiations sometimes are available. Blue Cross & Bhte Shield Mutual v. Bhle
Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 110 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 1997), presented a case where some
written comments delivered during negotiations were available to construe the
meaning of a contract provision and one party used the tactic of partial articulation of
the rationale for a provision. That case involved the interpretation of a provision that
terminated a license agreement. See id. at 321-22. The licensee sought to continue the
license and limit the scope of the termination provision on the following basis: A prior
license agreement had, in the licensee's view, a more limited termination provision
that would have been triggered only upon a party's bankruptcy or insolvency. See id.
at 328. When the license agreement was renewed, the licensor, in discussing a revised
termination provision, indicated in written comments that the new termination
provision was "'an updated version' of the old provision, 'with an express reference to
reversion of the [licensed service] Marks to the [licensee] in the event of [licensor's]
bankruptcy. It should be noted that federal bankruptcy laws may override the
automatic termination provisions hereof."' Id. It appears that these comments were
of the drafting party; the opinion references the comments as being "on the proposed
replacement provision." Id. The licensee unsuccessfully sought to use these
comments, made in the negotiation of the controlling provision, to limit the
application of the termination provision to the types of activities contemplated by the
licensor's comments-circumstances involving bankruptcy or insolvency of a party.
See id.
77. See generally infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the fraud
defense to enforcement of contracts).
78. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
79. See Shrank & Fritch, supra note 6, at 157.
80. See Davis, supra note 3, at 66 (stating, about the lease documentation, "a...
'document-freezing' provision will be contained in the Indenture for the benefit of the
Lenders").
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would not want to incur the potential liability for not having exercised
the applicable standard of care in agreeing to such a modification. In
any case, the modification would not occur without the consent of the
debt and equity participants. The debt and equity participants could
condition their agreement to a modification in the maintenance
requirements on delivery of a side payment of almost the entire
$500,000. To restrain this uncooperative behavior, the lessee could
threaten to take the aircraft to a location disfavored by the debt and
equity participants, for example.81
This hostage is somewhat different from the more traditional
hostage, such as the delivery of a security interest. It is a contractual
resolution that is hypothesized to be unusual-most contracts
produced by express bargaining about the subject matter do not reach
the particular resolution. Both parties may know of and bargain
about the language, but it is hypothesized that the adversely affected
party or parties (in this case, the debt and equity participants) do not
understand the import of the language at the time the contract is
negotiated. In this sense, one could refer to this hostage as "hidden."
The language of a particular contract may not afford a lawyer the
opportunity to secure a single "hidden" hostage that could be used by
his client to restrain opportunism in all contexts. Yet an equivalent
result could be reached through an array of "contingent" hostages.
Each of these hostages could be of effect only in a subset of the
possible future states in which opportunism could arise. An array of
contractual hostages could deter opportunism, if at least one in the
array would be effective in each potential future state. These hostages
can be entirely unrelated to the opportunism to be prevented, and
they can concern entirely different contract provisions.
An example based on GTE Mobilnet Ltd. Partnership v. Telecell
Cellular, Inc.' can illustrate the value of such a hidden hostage. GTE
Mobilnet ("Mobilnet") provided cellular telephone service. It used
agents to solicit customers.' The terms of one agency agreement
81. In particular cases, there may be benefits to the airline from strategic exercise
of these particular hostage rights. Subleasing the aircraft to a firm in a foreign
country that did not afford the original mortgagee practicably exercisable remedies
would effectively deprive the mortgagee of its security interest. If the original
mortgage did not attach to the payments from the sublessee, the airline could acquire
additional financing from a third party secured by the payment stream due from the
sublessee. Although divesting the original mortgagee of a method to realize on its
security would not release the airline from its obligation under the lease, it would
permit the airline to alter the relative priorities among its creditors. That alteration
could benefit the airline by producing a lower aggregate cost of capital. The effect is
similar to the impact of an LBO on existing creditors. See generally Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting
summary judgment in favor of a defendant issuer on a claim that an LBO
contemplated by the defendant violated the implied covenant of good faith).
82. 955 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1997).
83. See id. at 288.
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provided, in part, "In the event any other GTE Mobilnet agent signs
an Agency Agreement containing a Schedule 2, Agent Commission
Plan, with substantially and materially better terms, Agent shall be
presented with an opportunity to have said Schedule 2 substituted for
the Schedule 2 contained herein. '" This type of provision is
colloquially referred to as a "most favored nation" provision.
This case arose from a dispute between Mobilnet and two of these
agents, Telecell Cellular, Inc., and Feingersh Young Interests, Inc.
(the "complaining agents").85 Mobilnet believed the agents had not
been fulfilling their contractual obligations, and, in particular, that
they "had improperly used ... confidential information."86 On the
other hand, the agents had objections regarding the extent to which
Mobilnet fulfilled its contractual obligations; Mobilnet offered certain
promotions to another agent that it did not offer to the complaining
agents. The complaining agents claimed the provision of the agency
agreement quoted above' required Mobilnet to offer them
promotions offered to other agents, in addition to better commission
schedules.' The appellate court held that the quoted language was (i)
not ambiguous and (ii) did not require Mobilnet to offer the
complaining agents promotions offered others.8 9
The precise nature of these promotions is not reported. They in
some way benefited the favored agent. Promotional benefits can be
of various forms. One example would be the delivery of a free phone
to customers who signed up with the favored agent. Alternatively, the
promotions could consist of the provision by Mobilnet of a service
that the favored agent previously had to supply on its own. Some
form of targeted advertising would be an example.
Either of these types of discriminatory promotions has an economic
effect equivalent to charging a different fee schedule. Money is
fungible. The profit available to the disfavored agent is based on the
revenues from its commissions less expenses. An increase in selling
expenses has the same effect on the agent's profit as a decrease in the
commission schedule. If the disfavored agent has the same
commission schedule but is selling a product worth less than that sold
by the favored agent, the disfavored agent has to make up the
difference, if it is to get business. For example, if Mobilnet provided
free phones to customers who signed up with the favored agent, the
disfavored agent, to compete, would have to do so as well (or provide
84. Id.
85. See id. at 288-89.
86. GTE Mobilnet Says Ruling Reversed by Texas Court, Favoring GTE's
Defense, Radio Comm. Rep., Sept. 18, 1995, at 42, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allnews File.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See GTE Mobilnet, 955 S.W.2d at 288-89.
89. See id. at 289.
[Vol. 69
2000] TERRORIST TRANSACTION COST ENGINEER 51
some other benefit), but bear the cost on its own. That is equivalent
to (i) having the same promotions available in all sales but (ii) giving
the disfavored agent a commission rate lower per customer by the cost
of a phone.
This ruling may seem harsh. But a consideration of the context
suggests the power to evade the most favored nation obligation,
inherent in the language drafted by Mobilnet,' was being used as a
hostage to deter misconduct.
Although the opinion does not address the issue, it appears the
complaining agents were in direct competition with the agent who
received more favorable terms. That raises a question-why did
Mobilnet seek preferred terms for a competing agent for performing
agency duties in the same area, and risk liability to the complaining
agents for doing so? The complaining agents' rationale for these acts
was articulated by their counsel in a newspaper article: '"GTE had a
pet agent that it paid more per activation.' This undercut her clients
and gave the other agent an unfair business advantage .... "91
A desire to pay a "pet agent" more is not a sensible rationale. It
was in Mobilnet's own economic interest not to pay a third party more
for performing services identical to those being provided by the
complaining agents. The rationale articulated on behalf of the
complaining agents is that Mobilnet was essentially making a gift to
the other agents. A much more plausible reason is that the
complaining agents were not providing services of the same quality as
the other agents, and Mobilnet was forced to pay the other agents
more to induce the delivery of the higher level of performance that
Mobilnet desired.92 The subject matter of the contract-solicitation of
customers-did not allow precise monitoring of the effort expended
90. See id. at 291 ("There was much specific testimony that Mobilnet drafted [the]
paragraph....._").
91. Margaret Cronin Fisk, GTE Mobilnet Loses on Fraud Claim, Nat'l L., Feb.
28, 1994, at 16.
92. Not all cases in which a party seeks to avoid fulfilling a contractual obligation
to provide equal treatment among various parties will be benign. There may have
been other, inappropriate, reasons why Mobilnet sought to pay the third party a
greater commission, although the fact that counsel for the complaining agents
articulated a "pet agent" theory suggests the absence of a factual basis for such an
alternative in that case. Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc, 87 F.3d 224 (7th Cir.
1996), however, provides an illustration of a case where a party, for improper reasons,
sought to avoid compliance with a contractual provision mandating equal treatment
of various other parties. In Miller, a firm owned various television stations, of which
approximately one-half of the programming was of a religious character. See id. at
225. The owner had granted the manager of one station a right of first refusal on any
sale of that station. See id. There was a suggestion that the owner, in subsequently
negotiating a sale of the station, structured a contract with terms designed to frustrate
any attempt by the station manager to exercise his right of first refusal, for the reason
that the prospective purchaser would have been more likely to continue the religious
theme of the station. See id at 228.
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by the agent. And, as noted above,93 Mobilnet had concerns that the
complaining agents were improperly using confidential information,
which also could be difficult to prove. So it would seem that Mobilnet
sought to exercise a latent contractual right in order to punish the
complaining agents for improper performance that Mobilnet could
identify but thought would be difficult to prove.
In summary, this Part argues that the seizure of latent contractual
hostages can increase joint transaction value in particular cases. In
some cases, there may not be a natural hostage, such as those
available to lenders. Additionally, express requests for hostages can
derail the negotiation of an otherwise profitable transaction. These
factors can cause parties to seek latent contractual hostages that
increase joint transaction value.
III. LAWYERS' REPUTATIONS
The best hostages are "negative sum" hostages that limit the
hostage-taker's ability to act opportunistically. Unfortunately,
however, it is the provisions that provide these types of hostages that
appear the most unreasonable and seem to grant the beneficiary of
the provision little direct benefit while significantly punishing the
other party. Two implications of this fact merit discussion. First, this
method of advancing clients' interests, by taking hidden contractual
hostages, affects the public perception of lawyers. This Part addresses
that issue. Second, the ability to realize the benefits from this method
of creating hostages is dependent on judicial contract construction
that enforces these hidden hostages. Part IV discusses selected
applicable principles of contract construction and selected applicable
defenses to the enforcement of contracts.
A. Consequences of the Identification of a Hidden Hostage
Joint transaction value can be increased by the seizure of hidden
hostages, but crafting hidden contractual rights requires skill. Some
attempts to create hidden contractual rights are identified by the
opposing counsel before definitive documentation is executed. These
occasions, and the resulting client responses, affect lawyers'
reputations.
When a hidden hostage is identified during the course of
negotiations, it is in the interest of the potential hostage-taker to be
able to disassociate itself from the attempt. The rationale for
attempting to acquire a hidden hostage is that a patent request to take
a hostage can signal mistrust by the hostage-taker, which can prevent
a transaction from being negotiated to fruition. That a contracting
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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party sought to acquire a hostage "silently" could well strengthen the
signal.
A client can diffuse the signal by imputing responsibility to its
counsel. Others have argued that lawyers can add value by lending
their reputations to their clients, 9 much as investment bankers are
said to lend their reputations to companies in initial public offerings in
order to enhance the marketability of stock sold in an initial public
offering.95 In this context, however, counsel can act as a negative
reputation "sink." Counsel, by taking responsibility for having
included the offensive language, can deflect the negative reputation
that otherwise would accrue to the client were the client directly
responsible for the attempt to take a hidden hostage."
The structure of the most prestigious corporate law firms facilitates
the operation of this mechanism. 7 For the negative reputation to be
94. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at 512-13;
Gilson, supra note 18, at 290-93 (discussing, inter alia, the importance of lawyers'
reputations to the process of rendering legal opinions and accountants' reputations to
the process of delivering comfort letters); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L Econ. & Org. 53, 61 n.20
(1986); Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507, 512-13, 574 (1994); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical
Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 Va. L Rev. 1707, 173940 (1998); cf
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 Vand. L
Rev. 1387, 1389 (1986) (indicating clients may hire lawyers to benefit from the
reputations of their lawyers).
95. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 620 (1984).
96. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 660-62 (1976) (arguing that lawyers
can facilitate dispute resolution because their presence interposes in the negotiations
participants not bearing personal culpability for the acts of the clients).
A related argument concerns the reasons why clients engage outside counsel to
assist in the negotiation of transactions. See Edward A. Bernstein, Blaming the
Lawyer. The Role of the Lawyer in Reducing Agency Costs 7-10 (May 21, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Bernstein, Blaming the
Lawyer]. Certain outcomes in transactions in which an employee of a firm
participates may adversely affect the employee's career. Bernstein argues that
employees' risk aversion may undermine their ability to promote their employers'
interests. See id. at 1-2. Bernstein notes that clients engage outside counsel to insulate
employees from adverse professional consequences and thus eliminate the adverse
impact of employees' risk aversion from two of those outcomes: transaction
breakdown arising from overly aggressive negotiation and an unwise assumption of a
contingent risk that subsequently comes to fruition. See id. at 1-3, 7-10. He argues,
however, that the manner in which counsel are engaged and the organizational
structure of law firms may create agency problems that limit the ability of outside
counsel to realize the goals sought by clients. See id. at 3, 13-14; cf Gilson &
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at 530-33 (discussing similar
agency issues within a lav firm).
97. Organizational structure also can affect other aspects of a law firm's
performance. The fact that large law and accounting firms may have many clients will
decrease the ability of a particular client to compel firm malfeasance by threatening to
withdraw business. See Kraakman, supra note 94, at 71; see also Gilson & Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at 531 (discussing that the potential loss of
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attributable solely to counsel, the structure of the relationship
between lawyers and their clients must permit separation of their
respective reputations. An intimate relationship between a client and
its counsel would suggest that the negative acts of the lawyer should
taint the reputations of both. In this context, additional bureaucratic
layers between the client and the person ultimately responsible for
drafting the contract would facilitate a client's ability to divorce its
reputation from the actions of counsel.9"
Particularly suited to promoting this separation is a law firm
structure in which the person responsible for drafting the hidden
hostage is not the person directly engaged by the client. That
relationship is, in fact, created in many of the most prestigious law
firms in large cities. While a client may have an ongoing relationship
with a partner at a prestigious law firm, substantial drafting roles are
played by senior associates, and under the firms' promotion policies,
the vast majority of these senior associates will have limited tenures at
their firms.99
Part of the role of an outside transactional counsel is to negotiate
some provisions without involving the client in the details. In some
cases, however, a client may intentionally seek to transfer
responsibility for a particular negotiation posture to outside counsel.
That is, a client may instruct its counsel: "Include these provisions in
the next draft. I want you to say that these provisions should be
included on some legal basis, and that you, the lawyer, want them
one client probably will not affect the total revenue of a large firm).
For an alternative aspect of the impact of law firm structure on law firm
performance, see Ribstein, supra note 94, at 1715-16. He notes that larger firms may
have developed reputational capital that creates incentives for those firms to restrain
final period problems that would otherwise affect the performance of individual
lawyers. See id. at 1715-19.
98. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry
into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 112 (1993)
(arguing that reputational factors do not restrain over-aggressive activity by lawyers,
because "individual personnel can be scapegoated"); Shell, Opportunism, supra note
36, at 270 (arguing that reputational sanctions, i.e., sanctions against a firm arising
from its having acquired a negative reputation, can be diminished in large
organizations that "often can explain to prospective business partners that a particular
instance of opportunism was caused by a corporate agent who no longer influences
decisions or who exceeded company policies").
99. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age, supra note 14, at 571 n.14, 583
n.44, 585 n.51 (noting that only 8.6% of the lawyers who were associated with "one of
the.., most prestigious law firms in the United States" during 1964 to 1974 were
partners at the firm in 1987, and only 22.8% were promoted to partnership at "large
New York City firms").
For an alternative consequence of the limited tenure of associates, see Bernstein,
Blaming the Lawyer, supra note 96, at 18-19. The consequences of inadequate legal
advice in a transaction may not manifest themselves until long after the inadequate
advice has been rendered. Bernstein indicates that where a lawyer's tenure with his
firm is limited, there are diminished incentives for him to provide adequate legal
advice. See id.
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included for some legal reason." Although applicable rules of
professional conduct limit public disclosure of such a request,' ° the
request can facilitate the consummation of a transaction, with the
result that lawyers' reputations are diminished.
Thus, both as to technical legal issues and as to larger business
issues, outside counsel can facilitate the consummation of transactions
by allowing participants to deny responsibility for acts that, if
attributed to the participants themselves, would diminish mutual trust
and increase the likelihood of transaction breakdown.
B. Inadvertent Hostage Takers
This discussion has not yet addressed whether transactional lawyers
must knowingly take hostages. One could plausibly object to the
assertion that lawyers add value by taking hidden hostages if there is
no evidence that lawyers who take hidden hostages understand the
concept. 1 1 As no empirical data is being presented to support the
proposition that lawyers consciously attempt to take hidden hostages,
this Part argues that transactional lawyers need not be aware of the
value of hostages in order for this form of negotiation to persist.
Modem commercial litigation complements the process of taking
hidden hostages. Just as a party may obtain an array of contingent
hidden contractual rights, only some of which may be exercisable in
particular future states, federal civil litigation practice permits a
defendant to assert counterclaims not arising out of the transaction
that is the subject of the plaintiff's claims.I"
The commencement of litigation concerning a contract signals a
decrease in cooperation that will attend performance under the
contract. Even if a dispute that results in litigation concerns only part
of the contractual relationship, mistrust can permeate the entire
relationship.
Decreasing marginal costs of litigation compound the deleterious
impact from litigation pertaining to a part of the relationship. Some
litigation costs are not claim-specific. For example, some discovery
activities necessary to pursue or defend one claim can produce
100. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct restrict disclosure of "information
relating to representation of a client." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(1998). Between sophisticated parties, the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from
assisting a client's fraudulent conduct. See id. Rule 1.2(d). This rule should not
prevent lawyers from furthering a client's interests through negotiation tactics the
clients themselves can lawfully adopt.
101. See generally Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. Cal.
Interdisc. LJ. 43, 52 (1993) (criticizing rationalizations of individuals' failure to
bargain "to the last dollar" on the following basis: "[I1t takes remarkable modesty for
scholars to assume that ordinary people can intuitively arrive at the analysis that
yields optimal results, when scholars can do so only after much sophisticated training
and work.").
102. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
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information useful to litigate other claims. Thus, commencing
litigation on one claim may cause the assertion of other claims that
could not have been profitably asserted otherwise.103
The possibility of litigation can cause lawyers to scrutinize the
language of relevant contracts in search of ambiguity or rights of
which the principals were not previously aware, in order to form the
basis of a new "litigation position."1"4 But the identification of a
possible counterclaim, or a right of the defendant not previously
asserted, can redirect the parties to cooperative behavior. A plaintiff
who has nothing to lose from litigation has less incentive to act
cooperatively than one who faces a material counterclaim. A hidden
contractual hostage can be such a previously unasserted right.
While negotiating a commercial contract, a lawyer need not
consciously seek to obtain an unreasonable, latent right with the
purpose of returning cooperation to the parties' relationship at some
time in the future. Consider the stereotypical lawyer who derives
personal satisfaction from securing latent, unreasonable rights for his
client; the lawyer who likes to "slide things by" opposing counsel.
Lawyers who have that personality trait and who are accomplished in
securing latent rights will secure benefits for their clients. Clients
served by such lawyers will realize benefits when those with whom the
clients deal attempt to act opportunistically. The onerous provisions
negotiated by their counsel can facilitate returning a relationship to
one based on cooperative performance. The motives underlying the
lawyers' choices to seek unreasonable, latent contract rights are
irrelevant to the value of the rights they have secured for their clients.
These lawyers should garner reputations for negotiating documents
that produce desirable results for their clients when cooperation
between parties breaks down. Market forces cause lawyers who are
less willing to seek, or less able to obtain, unreasonable terms to be
less successful in retaining clients, ceteris paribus.1°5
Thus, it should not be surprising that popular culture views lawyers
as being unreasonable. However, lawyers may be "reasonably
unreasonable," and it is precisely those characteristics that appear to
be unreasonable that can promote aggregate transaction value and are
thus "reasonable."
103. Conversely, increasing litigation costs can encourage settlement. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, Social Norms, supra note 68, at 78 n.67 ("Consequently, as the litigation
costs that the defendant can threaten to impose on the plaintiff increase, the
minimum amount he will have to pay to induce the plaintiff to settle the claim at the
outset will decrease. Since relational standards increase the cost of litigation, they
may enable defendants with superior bargaining power to pay less in settlement.").
104. See generally Blinderman Constr. Co. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 529, 554
n.21 (1997) ("Plaintiff's ill-conceived interpretation [of the contract] strikes the court
far more as a belatedly-conceived litigation position than as a plausible justification
for plaintiff's [actions] . . ").
105. Other factors also can affect the extent to which a lawyer retains clients.
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IV. PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION AJND DEFENSES TO
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
Part III argued that the use of hidden hostages may increase the
value realized by transacting parties by increasing extra-judicial
resolution of disputes, thereby returning the parties to cooperative
performance of their obligations. For these hostages to be effective,
the parties whose opportunism is to be restrained must perceive some
possibility that a court would enforce the terms of the hidden hostages
as written.0 6 Therefore, the effectiveness of these hostages in
deterring opportunism extra-judicially is critically dependent on
certain legal principles of contract construction and defenses to
contract enforcement.
Enforcing a hidden contractual hostage in a particular context could
appear to require an excessively literal approach to contract
construction. A recent controversial opinion by Judge Easterbrook
colorfully identified the issues:
We do not doubt the force of the proverb that the letter killeth,
while the spirit giveth life. Literal implementation of unadorned
language may destroy the essence of the venture. Few people pass
out of childhood without learning fables about genies, whose
wickedly literal interpretation of their "masters"' wishes always
leads to calamity. Yet knowledge that literal enforcement means
some mismatch between the parties' expectation and the outcome
does not imply a general duty of "kindness" in performance, or of
judicial oversight into whether a party had "good cause" to act as it
did.107
Although some principles of contract interpretation and some
defenses to the enforcement of a contract limit the ability to take
hidden hostages, various elements of those principles may facilitate
the creation of hidden hostages. This Part reviews the implications of
selected principles of contract construction and selected contract
enforcement defenses on the ability of lawyers to take hidden
hostages.10
A. Reasonable Construction of Contract Language
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, "[A]n interpretation
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the
terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part
106. The precise probability will vary depending on the circumstances-the value
to be gained from opportunistic behavior, etc.
107. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990).
108. This discussion continues to assume that the contractual hostage in question is
the product of negotiation between sophisticated parties represented by counsel.
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unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect."1"9 The comments provide the
following example:
A licenses B to manufacture pipes under A's patents, and B agrees
to pay "a royalty of 50 cents per 1,000 feet for an output of 5,000,000
or less feet per year, and for an output of over 5,000,000 feet per
year at the rate of 30 cents per thousand feet." The 50 cent rate is
payable on the first 5,000,000 feet, the 30 cent rate only on the
excess. The more literal reading is unreasonable, since it would
involve a smaller payment for 6,000,000 feet than for 4,000,000
feet. 110
Commentators have argued that courts should fill gaps in contracts
by providing the terms that reasonable, informed parties would have
provided in the circumstances had they bargained expressly about the
matters in question.111 That approach is an extension of the principle
that methods of contract construction should provide a reasonable
meaning to contract terms.
The essential character of a "reasonable" interpretation is that it
reflects an outcome that would be reached by informed parties who
109. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981); accord 5 Margaret N.
Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.22, at 239 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1998).
110. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 cmt. c, illus. 1. "Reasonableness" in
this context may be in the eye of the beholder. Consider an advertisement of a sale to
the effect of 20% off for all persons who purchase, in the aggregate, over $200 of
goods and 25% for aggregate purchases over $300. Assume that the advertisement
was sufficiently definite, e.g., it was limited to items in stock, so that it would be
treated as an offer. I suspect that most individuals would be surprised if, upon
presenting merchandise with an aggregate pre-sale price of $350, they were advised
that the total sales price would be $317.50 ($200.00 + 0.8($300.00 - $200.00) +
0.75($350.00 - $300.00)), and not $262.50 (0.75 x $350.00). The interpretation of the
advertisement indicating a price of $317.50 would be similar to the interpretation
favored by the Restatement in the quoted example. I also suspect persons purchasing
merchandise with an aggregate pre-sale price less than $300, if they thought about it,
would expect to pay no more than $225.01 (0.75 x $300.01).
111. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 165 (1992); Posner, supra note 12, at
93; cf Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Posner, J.) ("But whether we say that a contract shall be deemed to contain such
implied conditions as are necessary to make sense of the contract, or that a contract
obligates the parties to cooperate in its performance in 'good faith' to the extent
necessary to carry out the purposes of the contract, comes to much the same thing.
They are different ways of formulating the overriding purpose of contract law, which
is to give the parties what they would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of
making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of
negotiating and adding provisions to the contract had been zero."); Barnett, supra
note 21, at 906 (arguing in favor of a slightly different approach: "default rules that
reflect the commonsense expectations of persons in the relevant community of
discourse"); Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 21, at 1878 ("[Clareful
analysis requires that courts adopt the simple hypothetical bargain conception in a
number of important respects."); Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 14, at 433
("[L]egal intervention improves transactors' welfare by enforcing certain terms that
the transactors would have placed into a legal contract were it not for high drafting
costs." (footnote omitted)). See generally infra Part IV.E (discussing cases construing
the implied covenant of good faith to a similar effect).
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had bargained expressly about the matter. One might characterize the
drafting of a provision having an unreasonable, latent, literal meaning
as "sharp dealing." A first order analysis, one disregarding
consequential effects of hostages, would indicate this type of sharp
dealing is not efficient"' and should be discouraged."' But those
elements that optimize the joint value of a contract by "creating a
hostage" make the term itself appear unreasonable.
An optimal hostage creates a right that directly benefits the holder
of the right to a negligible extent while imposing material costs on the
other party. It is only the "indirect," "consequential" or "second
order" impact of the hostage, the decreased opportunism produced by
threats to exercise the hostage rights, that increases the joint value of
a transaction. It is the "unreasonableness" that makes a hostage
desirable and that causes the use of hostages to persist.
Consequently, in contexts where a provision could restrain
opportunism, a court is unable to determine whether a contract
provision is "reasonable." Whether a hostage increases joint value
depends on three factors: (1) the likelihood that the party
relinquishing the hostage otherwise would act opportunistically, (2)
the impact the hostage has on restraining opportunistic behavior, and
(3) the extent to which the hostage increases the hostage-holder's
likelihood of acting opportunistically. The participants' ethical
viewpoints and the values they place on their reputations will affect
the extent to which delivery of a hostage increases joint value. These
factors are participant-specific in that in identical transactions, the
measures are dependent on the identities of the participants.
Reference to objective criteria, such as the provision most frequently
resulting from express negotiations about a particular issue, cannot
reflect these crucial subjective factors.
The requirement that contract terms be construed to produce a
result that is "reasonable" thus impedes the ability of parties to
provide by contract for the delivery of hostages that can increase joint
transaction value. This discussion is not intended to argue for the
converse of the traditional rule by saying that all ambiguous contract
terms should be interpreted so as to provide an unreasonable result.
Rather, the point is more limited. Although the traditional rule on its
face appears irrefutable, it will produce inferior results in some cases.
B. Contra Proferentenz
The principle of contra proferenten is a second rule of contract
112. See generally Shell, Ethical Standards, supra note 20, at 1206 n.40 (-If laws
increase honesty and reduce sharp dealing without producing offsetting losses, they
promote efficiency.").
113. Cf Barnett, supra note 21, at 883 n.164 (arguing that a duty of good faith
should be implied in contracts, because it is unlikely that a party to a contract would
knowingly grant the other party the power to perform the contract in bad faith).
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construction that impinges on the ability of a party to acquire a hidden
hostage. This principle provides that ambiguous language in a
contract is to be construed against the party who provided the
language.114 Recognition of hidden hostages would appear to violate
the core of this principle. Yet two refinements of the principle
adopted by some courts are consistent with the recognition of hidden
hostages.
First, some courts restrict the application of contra proferentem to
contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power.1 5 This
modified rule of contra proferentem is in harmony with allowing
beneficial hidden hostages. Parties having the power to impose non-
financial terms on those with whom they contract may be more likely
to act opportunistically and exercise a hidden hostage. Those same
factors that afford a party the power to dictate non-financial terms
may eliminate restraints that otherwise would prevent its
opportunism. For example, factors limiting the dissemination of
information and facilitating one party's imposition of inappropriate
non-financial terms may limit the reputational costs accruing to a
dominant party from acting opportunistically.
Furthermore, there are insignificant benefits to enforcing hidden
hostages in contracts of adhesion. Absent a mistake, the hidden
hostage generally would benefit the dominant party. Where the
dominant party has the power to include a wide range of terms in a
contract, there is no need for that party to seize a hidden hostage.
Thus, this modified principle of contra proferentem, limiting its
application to contracts of adhesion, appropriately demarcates
circumstances in which the taking of a hidden hostage should be
proscribed.
A second, independent refinement of the principle of contra
proferentem addresses contracts negotiated in circumstances with no
significant imbalance in the parties' power. The negotiation of a
114. See Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 663 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("[U]nder the principle of contra proferentum, courts are to construe
ambiguous contract terms against the drafter."); Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Department
of Transp., 87 F.3d 498, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
206; Kniffin, supra note 109, § 24.27, at 282-83.
115. See, e.g., Nunn v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 856 F.2d 1464, 1469
(10th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply canon when parties are of equal bargaining power);
Little Susitna Constr. Co. v. Soil Processing, Inc., 944 P.2d 20, 25 n.7 (Alaska 1997)
(stating that a contract is not construed against the drafter when negotiated between
"equally situated parties"); Kniffin, supra note 109, § 24.27, at 292 (noting that contra
proferentem may be inappropriate "if both parties are equally sophisticated"). But see
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1996) ("'[C]ommon' rule that terms
are construed against drafter 'often operates against a party that is at a distinct
advantage in bargaining... [but] may be invoked even if the parties bargained as
equals."' (quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.11, at 518
(1990))). See generally Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 21, at 1854 n.133
(arguing against the application of the principle to cases involving sophisticated
participants).
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complex commercial contract can involve multiple iterations, with the
final contract consisting of the synthesis of a series of comments on
various provisions. One could attempt to apply the principle of contra
proferentem on a clause-by-clause basis, and in that view, contract
interpretation would depend on an examination of the drafting history
of each provision. Drafting responsibility for some provisions would
be attributed to one party, and responsibility for other provisions
would be attributed to the other party.
However, some courts refuse to apply this doctrine to the
interpretation of such a contract. 1 6 For example, the court in RCI
Northeast Services Division v. Boston Edison Co. 117 addressed a
dispute concerning a contract prepared by Boston Edison that
incorporated, by reference, a bid prepared by RCI.V 8 The dispute
addressed the meaning of a provision from that bid. In response to
Boston Edison's argument that the provision should be construed
against RCI, the court stated: "Though RCI proposed the ...
language initially, it was Edison that decided to employ the
116. See Consumers Ice Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1161, 1165 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
("[S]ince the contract language was the product of negotiation, neither party may be
called to task for failing to seek clarification of what seems to be language that is
ambiguous on its face."); Homac, Inc. v. DSA Fin. Corp., 661 F. Supp. 776, 788 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) ("[T]he justification for applying such rule pales in a situation, like the
instant one, where the terms of an agreement resulted from a series of negotiations
between experienced drafters." (quoting E.I. duPont de Nemours v. Shell Oil Co., 498
A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 1985))); Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F. Supp. 352, 354 (W.D. Pa.
1973) ("[W]here a contract is the result of the joint efforts of attorneys or negotiators,
then it is not to be construed against either party."); United States v. Continental Oil
Co., 237 F. Supp. 294,298 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (citing an "exception to the general rule
that a writing is construed most strongly against the draftsman when the words
involved are the common language of both parties or the contract is the joint effort of
the attorneys and technicians for both sides"), aff'd, 364 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1966);
Beck v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 111 F. Supp. 824, 828 (N.D. Iowa 1953) ("It is held that
such rule of construction is not applicable where the contract is prepared with the aid
and approval of and under the scrutiny of legal counsel for each of the parties
thereto."); Centennial Enters., Inc. v. Mansfield Dev. Co., 568 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo.
1977) ("The evidence clearly indicated that the agreement was the product of several
negotiating sessions and that [the party seeking benefit from the rule of contra
proferentem] was responsible for at least one draft of the contract. The rule ...
therefore, has no applicability."); Schultz v. Kneidl, 153 A.2d 779, 782 (NJ. 1959)
("Although plaintiffs' brief suggests that the lease was drawn by the landlord's
attorney and therefore that 'the construction of the lease should tend to favor the
tenant rather than the landlord,' it developed at oral argument that although the
original draft of the lease was prepared by the landlord's attorney, that draft was
substantially revised at conferences held between the parties and their respective
attorneys, so that the present lease, 16 pages long and containing 29 articles, is the
product of the joint efforts of the attorney for the lessor and the attorney for the
lessees. There is no basis for the application of the quoted rule of construction."
(citation omitted)), aftd, 157 A.2d 861 (NJ. 1960); Kniffin, supra note 109, § 24.27, at
291 (citing RCI Northeast Svcs. Div. v. Boston Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199 (1st Cir.
1987)).
117. 822 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1987).
11& See iL at 200.
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phraseology in the final contract. Thus, if RCI was the natural mother
of the clause, Edison was equally its adoptive father-and both of
these worldly-wise litigants must share the responsibility for the
clause's upbringing. "119
This modification to the rule of contra proferentem also is consistent
with the beneficial use of hidden hostages. The point of a beneficial
hidden hostage is that it decreases the extent to which a contract must
address possible future states. Simple contracts, in which there is little
or no back and forth negotiation of the provisions, are less likely to be
complex enough to warrant the creation of hidden hostages. The
creation of hidden contractual rights in those simple contractual
relationships may inordinately reflect attempts by the draftsman to
facilitate his client's own opportunism. Thus, there is a rough
similarity between those contracts to which this modified rule of
contra proferentem would apply and those contracts simple enough
not to justify the creation of hidden hostages.
C. Extrinsic Evidence and State Laws Regulating Deceptive Practices
The ability of parties to take hidden hostages is also restrained in
those jurisdictions that have rejected the plain meaning rule. Under
the plain meaning rule, evidence of prior negotiations cannot be
introduced to show that a written contract is ambiguous. 2 0 Courts
rejecting, or relaxing, the plain meaning rule allow evidence of the
negotiations to be introduced for purposes of demonstrating
ambiguity. This position, in turn, increases the extent to which
extrinsic evidence can be used to shape the understanding of the terms
of the relationship. 121 A defining characteristic of a hidden hostage is
that its function was not discussed during the negotiation of the
contract. The benefit of recognizing hidden hostages derives from the
ability to muffle signals during contract formation that would prevent
consummation of otherwise value-increasing transactions. The
"hidden hostage" impact of the contract provision necessarily will not
have been discussed during contract negotiation.
119. Id. at 203 n.3.
120. See generally 2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.12 (3d ed. 1999) (indicating
that the "overwhelming majority" of jurisdictions have retained some form of the
plain meaning rule).
121. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568-69(9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing the role of extrinsic evidence in discerning parties' original
intentions as compared to the plain meaning of the contract); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-46 (Cal. 1968) (en banc)
(admitting extrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of the parties); Morey v.
Vannucci, 64 Cal. App. 4th 904, 912 (1998) (allowing extrinsic evidence to be
admitted so long as the evidence does not lend itself to an unreasonable
interpretation of the contract); see generally 2 Farnsworth, supra note 120, § 7.12
(discussing courts' relaxation of the plain meaning rule by allowing evidence of prior
negotiations in interpreting contract language).
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As suggested above," one method by which lawyers take hidden
hostages involves articulating to opposing counsel a truthful but
innocuous reason for a contract provision. For example, the lawyer
could explain that the provision remedies a specific problem all would
agree should be addressed, while not disclosing a second impact of the
provision that constitutes a hidden hostage. The rejection of the plain
meaning rule could permit introduction of evidence of the
negotiations, limiting the impact of the provision to the articulated,
i.e., innocuous, impact. This approach thus substantially restrains the
ability to take hidden hostages.'2
The ability to take these hostages is further impeded by some state
laws, modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"),
that regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices. 24 Businesses are
given a cause of action under some of these statutes. 25 Just as the
rejection of the plain meaning rule diminishes the impact written
contractual terms have on the controlling terms of a judicially-defined
contractual relationship, these state laws de-emphasize the
importance of written contracts in business relationships. 2 " The case
law under those acts indicates a risk that the exercise of a contract
right designed as a hidden hostage would be considered part of a
proscribed plan of deception.
G. Richard Shell indicates the leading definition of deception
actionable under such state statutes requires that the "practice must
have a 'tendency or capacity' to mislead .. . in a material way.'" One
122. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
123. In a related context, Judge Kozinski has noted that costs are attendant to the
use of equitable principles to avoid literal enforcement of a contract: -When parties
are allowed to undermine the finality of written instruments, every transaction can be
held hostage to competing claims as to what might have been said or believed by any
of the participants.... In any event, litigating such claims, no matter how legitimate,
is expensive, time-consuming and nerve-racking." Ryan v. Corey (In re Corey), 892
F.2d 829, 838 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing equitable principles under Hawaii law
that permit recharacterization of deeds as mortgages not intended to convey equitable
title).
124. See generally Shell, Ethical Standards, supra note 20, at 1200 (stating that all 50
states have adopted laws modeled directly or indirectly on § 5 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982)).
125. See id. at 1215. Shell asserts that Massachusetts "appears" to have been the
first jurisdiction that extended to businesses the right to assert a cause of action under
a state version of the FTC Act. Id. at 1214. It is for this reason that Massachusetts
cases are prominent in extending the reach of these statutes to customary business
disputes.
126. See icl. at 1235 ("Contracts are important in state FTC Act analysis only to the
extent they describe the explicit commercial relationship between the parties. If the
conduct of one of the parties falls short of the implicit behavioral assumptions
underlying the relationship, the court may ignore the contract and regulate the
underlying conduct by applying contextually based standards of unfairness and
deception.").
127. Id. at 1218-19.
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example is an "insistence on a 'bad faith' interpretation of an
ambiguous contract term. '' 28
Shell discusses Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Checkers,
Inc.,9 in which a soft drink distributor refused to pay its supplier
$61,000, an amount not in dispute, to enhance the distributor's
bargaining power in resolving a dispute concerning the amount of
product to which the distributor was entitled a.1 3 The court upheld a
judgment in favor of the supplier, in an amount equal to three times
the amount of the debt plus attorneys' fees,13 ' noting, "There was no
relation between [the supplier's] fully liquidated claim for product it
had delivered in the past, and [the distributor's] desire to persuade
[the supplier] to sell more product to [the distributor]. 32
This type of statute has been held to apply to one party's erroneous
interpretation of a contract. F. Ray Moore Oil Co. v. State133 involves
a contract requiring a state supplier to disclose the source of its
inventory. 34 The supplier changed sources, reducing its costs, and
neither reduced the price charged the State nor advised the State of
the change. 35 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding
that the supplier's acts were unlawfully deceptive, which decision was
accompanied by an award of treble damages.3 6
The supplier alleged that it believed it was properly interpreting the
contract by neither adjusting the rate paid to the State nor advising
the State of its new source. 37 The court relied on extrinsic evidence to
prove that the terms of the contract required the supplier to advise the
State of any change in source, and thus the supplier violated the
contract terms by failing to do so. 138
The principle underlying the Checkers and F. Ray Moore Oil Co.
decisions can significantly affect the efficacy of hidden hostages in
certain jurisdictions, particularly those that consider failure to perform
a contract an actionable deceptive trade practice. Hostages are useful
when one party can identify, but cannot prove in court, that the other
party has acted opportunistically. 39 The only hostage restraining
opportunism in such a context may well be unrelated to the contract
provision governing the performance that is being rendered in an
128. Id. at 1225.
129. 754 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1985).
130. See id. at 18.
131. See id. at 12.
132. Id. at 18.
133. 341 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. 1986).
134. See id. at 373.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 374.
139. See generally Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 1, at
517-18 (noting that the parties may be able to identify opportunism that cannot be
proved in court).
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opportunistic fashion. But the existence of a hidden hostage often will
be in doubt. Gauging the likelihood that a contract will be interpreted
in accordance with its terms is an art, not a science. A party who
seeks to restrain opportunism by threatening to exercise a hidden
hostage may be uncertain as to whether a court would enforce the
hostage rights. The power of the threat in such a context is
substantially diminished if a judicial decision to "release" the hostage
is accompanied by the imposition of a penalty on the party that
threatened to exercise hostage rights. These state statutes, in fact,
frequently provide for treble or other extra-compensatory (i.e.,
punitive) damage awards. 14 Thus, in jurisdictions with this type of
statute, the efficacy of contingent hidden hostages in restraining
opportunism may be limited to the extremely narrow circumstances
where the hostage is related to the opportunism sought to be
restrained."' 1 Any other threat could subject the party holding the
hostage to a claim of a bad-faith assertion of an unrelated claim,
subjecting the hostage-holder to potential extra-compensatory
liability.
D. Fraud and Hidden Contractual Hostages
As noted above,14 2 one method by which hidden contractual
hostages can be obtained involves a lawyer identifying only one of two
possible implications of a contract provision. This negotiation
strategy could be regarded as fraudulent.1 43  Were this method of
140. See Shell, Ethical Standards, supra note 20, at 1219.
141. Cf. id. at 1242 n.245 (arguing that extra-compensatory damages, coupled with
legal rules requiring compliance with vague legal standards, can "overdeter"
undesirable conduct).
142. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
143. This negotiation strategy also could be considered unethical. The ethics of
negotiation have been the subject of significant commentary. See, e.g., Hazard, supra
note 11, at 188-93 (considering the "problem of trustworthiness in negotiations");
Langevoort, supra note 98, at 81-83 (discussing a lawyer's obligation to be truthful in
negotiations); Perschbacher, supra note 67, at 97 n.119 (noting that a draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct attempted to give specific guidelines for general
duties of fairness to others in negotiations); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers'
Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La. L. Rev. 577, 578 (1975) (noting that ethical conduct in
negotiations is not specifically addressed by most writings about lawyers' ethics);
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L
Rev. 669, 685-88 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, Professionalism] (arguing, inter alia,
that a lawyer should not assist a client entering into a contract that, based on facts
known to the lawyer, would not be enforceable against his client, where the other
party is unaware of the contract's unenforceability); Steele, supra note 94, at 1403-04
(proposing a rule obligating "fairness and candor" in negotiations); Alan Strudler, On
the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation, 5 Bus. Ethics Q. 805, 818-19 (1995) (arguing in
favor of permitting deception where allowing deception is "potentially mutually
advantageous"); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L
Rev. 1219, 1272 (1990) (arguing that although lying may be effective in negotiations,
many lies are "ethically impermissible"); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar
Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 4 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926, 927 (1980)
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negotiation fraudulent, the ability of sophisticated commercial parties
to take latent contractual hostages would be substantially diminished.
Although there are theories under which a sophisticated commercial
party could challenge as fraudulent the enforceability of a latent
contractual hostage obtained through such a studied omission, case
law suggests that such a challenge would be unsuccessful.
Case law in some jurisdictions indicates that, between sophisticated
parties, misstatements of the legal consequences of a contract will not
("[A] careful examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, honest, and
trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their
opponents about their true positions.").
This negotiation strategy does not easily fit within the frameworks of typical ethical
dictates. Steele, for example, argues that transactional lawyers should seek to
negotiate agreements that are "fair." Steele, supra note 94, at 1403 ("[W]hen serving
as a negotiator lawyers should strive for a result that is objectively fair."). In contexts
where this negotiation tactic is used to prevent opportunistic behavior, ethical
criticisms of this mode of negotiation in highly negotiated transactions with parties
represented by counsel, on the basis that it produces "unfair" results, are inapposite.
The best hidden contractual hostages are, by definition, "unfair" at some level. The
characteristics that make them "unfair" are those that also make them most useful.
Moreover, this mechanism for restraining opportunism is useful where the
circumstances creating the incentives for opportunistic behavior were not foreseen at
the time the original bargain was reached. If, at the time a contract is formed, the
parties cannot accurately ascertain whether the contract will fairly allocate the risks
that actually arise, it becomes substantially problematic to determine whether the
taking of a hidden hostage will produce an "unfair" result. An assessment of the
ethical propriety of this mode of negotiation on that basis would therefore be
complex.
Wetlaufer concludes that a party to a negotiation may ethically lie in response to a
question seeking information that there is no obligation to disclose, where the
questioned party could either disclose such information or lie. See Wetlaufer, supra, at
1269-70. Because, in the transactions discussed in this Article, neither party has an
obligation to provide legal advice to the other, Wetlaufer's view would suggest
approval of lying in this context, absent other responses that do not result in the
disclosure sought to be avoided.
Alternatively, one could conclude that this strategy is ethical if used against a party
believed to be seizing hidden contractual hostages. Wetlaufer concludes that
dishonesty of one's contracting party, by itself, does not excuse lying. See id. at 1267;
cf. Strudler, supra, at 819 (asserting that a "mutual advantage" rationalization for
mendacity "shows more promise" than self-defense). Wetlaufer discounts the
argument that lying by the recipient of a lie is justified to eliminate the advantage
otherwise gained by the first party to lie, on the basis that identifying the original lie
necessarily eliminates its effectiveness. See Wetlaufer, supra, at 1267. This reasoning
suggests that one is not justified in attempting to seize a hidden contractual hostage if
the other party has sought to do so. Yet, that one party has attempted to seize a
hidden contractual hostage increases the likelihood that there are other hidden
contractual hostages as yet undiscovered, suggesting that the propriety of the
reciprocal taking of hidden contractual hostages in such a context is more easily
defended.
Were this negotiation strategy considered fraudulent, its use would, of course, be
unethical. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4 (1998); cf id. Rule 4.1
(proscribing a lawyer's "mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person"). But cf. Craver, supra note 34, at 405 ("[A]dvocate prevarication during legal
negotiations rarely results in bar disciplinary action .... "); Schwartz, Professionalism,
supra, at 682 (asserting that lawyers are rarely disciplined for fraudulent conduct).
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be actionable as fraud.1" Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Stuart,'4 - involves
a challenge to the enforceability of a provision in franchise
agreements for Subway sandvich shops. The provision required
arbitration of any disputed breach of the franchise agreements."
Under each agreement, the franchisees were required to lease the
shop premises from an affiliate of the franchisor under a separate
lease, which did not contain an arbitration provision. 7 The form of
lease had a cross-default, under which a default by the franchisee
under the franchise agreement constituted a breach of the lease,
entitling the franchisor to evict the franchisees."4
After a dispute arose concerning compliance with the franchise
agreements, the franchisees initiated a lawsuit in state court, seeking a
declaration that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable on the
basis of fraud, inter alia.49 The franchisor then initiated a suit in
federal court, seeking an order compelling arbitration."' On appeal
to the Second Circuit, the franchisees reiterated their claim of fraud.
They alleged the franchisor "fraudulently induced them into executing
the franchise agreements by falsely representing that arbitration was a
condition precedent to the institution of legal action by either party to
the franchise agreement." 1
The allegedly fraudulent acts in that case are more extreme than the
method discussed above to take a hidden contractual hostage. The
quoted allegation in Doctor's Associates involves a false affirmative
statement of the legal import of the contract, as opposed to an
omission. That act corresponds to a party seeking to take a hidden
contractual hostage by falsely stating that an identified consequence
of a contract provision represents its sole effect, knowing that there is
a second, less benign implication.
The fact pattern in Doctor's Associates does not seem to involve the
taking of a negative sum hostage but rather an attempt to create latent
provisions that divest the franchisees of a right for a corresponding
benefit for the franchisor. The documents appear to have provided
generally for arbitration but selected out, and allowed judicial
procedures in, a subset of disputes in which resort to judicial process
would benefit only the franchisor.
144. Cf. Wetlaufer, supra note 143, at 1242 n.74 (stating, -misrepresentations of law
are not cognizable for purposes of fraud," on the basis that reliance thereon is
unreasonable).
145. 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. See id. at 977-78.
147. See iU.
148. See id at 978.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id at 979.
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Nevertheless, the court held in Doctor's Associates that, as a matter
of law, the franchisees' allegations did not provide a basis for a fraud
defense:
Defendants[, the franchisees,] have utterly failed to allege, much less
prove, sufficient facts indicating that they were defrauded into
agreeing to arbitrate. Before purchasing their franchises,
Defendants received a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular
("UFOC") from [the franchisor]. The UFOC included copies of
both the standard franchise agreement and the sublease. Although
the franchise agreement contains an arbitration clause, the sublease
does not; rather, it provides that if the sublessee breaches the
franchise agreement, the sublessor may terminate the sublease and
bring an eviction action. These clauses were not camouflaged, and
Defendants cannot now complain that they failed to read or inquire
into the meaning of those documents. 152
As is the case with many of the relevant opinions in this area, the
court's language seems somewhat at odds with the facts. The court
indicates that the prominence of the provisions prevents the
franchisees from asserting a defense on the basis that they "failed to
read or inquire into" ' the meaning of the terms. Yet the franchisees'
claim was not merely that the provision was buried, but that there was
a false statement concerning its impact."5 Nevertheless, the court
concluded no fraud defense was available. 155
Doctor's Associates reflects a very restrictive application of fraud to
misstatements made in the course of contract negotiations. It may be
that the drafting gambit at issue in the case is familiar to counsel who
frequently work in the franchise area, but I suspect many transactional
lawyers, including those with significant experience, would not spot
the implications of these provisions. The reference to
"camouflaged" '156 clauses must then be taken to refer to the location of
the actual clauses and not their import. Thus, at least in that court,
where the text of the provision in question has not been placed in an
obscure location, a false statement between sophisticated parties
about the legal consequences of the document will not give rise to
fraud liability. In the context of a fraud claim, a latent contractual
hostage negotiated through a conscious omission of one of various
consequences of a contractual provision is enforceable; there can be
no complaint that the language in question was located in an obscure
place. If the parties actually discuss a contract provision, no party can
plausibly claim that it was not aware the contract provision was in the
documents signed.
152. Id. at 980. The court further held that no reliance had been shown. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 979-80.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 980.
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Doctor's Associates is not unique in restricting the assertion of a
fraud defense against one who made a false statement concerning the
legal consequences of a document. For example, in Cohen v.
Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc.,'1 the court held that allegations
brought by customers of a stock brokerage firm were insufficient to
create a defense of fraud.158  The customers had signed a margin
agreement provided by the brokerage firm which required arbitration
of disputes. The customers subsequently alleged that an agent of the
brokerage firm had advised them that the agreement would "not
compromise any of [their] rights."159 Cohen is stronger than necessary
for purposes of understanding the enforceability of latent contractual
hostages against a sophisticated party and suggests an imbalance in
bargaining power and an absence of negotiation.
A series of cases construing Texas law articulates a developed
analysis of the issue, 16° which parallels the issues as framed by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 6' These cases generally deny
relief on the basis of fraud where there were affirmative
misstatements. It follows that no fraud defense would prevent the
enforcement of hidden contractual hostages negotiated with the
strategy of omissions contemplated here.
A seminal Texas case is Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene National
Bank."6 The court in Fina Supply identified two traditional theories
under which false statements about the legal consequences of a
document could be fraudulent. First, "[a] party having superior
knowledge, who takes advantage of another's ignorance of the law to
deceive him by studied concealment or misrepresentation, can be held
responsible for this conduct."'" Second, the court stated,
"[M]isrepresentations involving a point of law will be considered
misrepresentations of fact if they were intended and understood as
such."164  These theories parallel the relevant provisions of the
Restatement.
157. 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
158. See iU. at 287-88.
159. Id. at 286-87 (discussing the proposition that "[t]he [plaintiffs] cannot use their
failure to inquire about the ramifications of that clause to avoid the consequences of
agreed-to arbitration" (quoting Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334,
339 (7th Cir. 1984))). But cf Chamberlin v. Fuller, 9 A. 832, 836 (Vt. 1887) (-No
rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his victim is by
chance a fool.").
160. See Boggan v. Data Sys. Network Corp., 969 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992); Gold
Kist, Inc. v. Carr, 886 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1994); Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat'l Bank,
726 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1987).
161. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 169(b), 170 (1981).
162. 726 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1987).
163. Id at 540.
164. Id The court also identified a third traditional theory, not relevant to this
discussion, where fraud arises by virtue of a relationship of trust and confidence. See
id
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Under the Restatement, a statement of opinion, as opposed to a
statement of fact, can be the basis of a fraud defense only in limited
circumstances, such as where the victim "reasonably believes that, as
compared with himself, the person whose opinion is asserted has
special skill... with respect to the subject matter."165 This test is
similar to the first theory articulated in Fina Supply. The
Restatement, however, also recognizes that statements of law can be
statements of fact and can be actionable on that basis. 166 The second
theory identified in Fina Supply addresses circumstances in which
misrepresentations of the legal consequences of a document made in
the course of negotiations could be considered misrepresentations of
fact.
A literal reading of both these theories would seem to indicate that
the seizure of latent contractual hostages would give rise to a fraud
defense. But these theories, as they have been construed, would not
render latent contractual hostages obtained in negotiated transactions
between sophisticated parties unenforceable through a failure to
disclose the full impact of the provision creating the hostage.
The first theory has two elements: the wrongdoer had "superior
knowledge" and there was "studied concealment or
misrepresentation."167  The second element seems to be met in
virtually any circumstance where fraud was alleged, including cases
where one party takes a latent contractual hostage. The first element
seems to be satisfied almost by definition, as long as the victim can
prove the reliance element of fraud. These allegations of fraud arise
where the victim alleges that the wrongdoer believed a contract would
have a particular legal consequence but caused the victim to believe
that there would be an alternative legal consequence. For the victim
to complain successfully, the interpretation believed by the victim
during negotiations must be proved wrong, and the wrongdoer's
unexpressed interpretations proved correct. Thus, by definition, the
wrongdoer was better informed of the consequences of the relevant
contract provisions.
However, the court in Fina Supply construed this "superior
knowledge" element of the first theory of fraud in a different fashion.
Rather than inquiring into whether the alleged wrongdoer was correct
in its assessment, the court instead focused on the sophistication of the
parties. The court read the "superior knowledge" requirement as
addressing access to knowledge1" and held that an alleged wrongdoer
does not have "superior knowledge" where the parties are equally
sophisticated and both have access to legal counsel. 69
165. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 169(b).
166. See id. § 170 cmt. a.
167. Fina Supply, 726 S.W.2d at 540.
168. See id.
169. See id.
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Furthermore, the court narrowly construed the element of
deception. The court indicated that as between sophisticated parties,
the deception requirement is satisfied only where the alleged
wrongdoer prevented the victim from examining the implications of
the contract term in question.170 This view suggests a requirement for
malfeasance at the level of tampering with the copy of the document
sent to opposing counsel or falsely advising opposing counsel that all
changes had been marked in some fashion. The court stated, "No
artifice or fraud was employed which prevented [the victim] from
making an examination of the [contract] amendments to determine
whether they accomplished the desired [results] .... 171
The court in Fina Supply similarly construed the second theory
under which misrepresentations of the legal consequences of a
contract provision can be fraudulent. This construction would render
the theory generally inapplicable to commercial transactions between
sophisticated parties. As to the alternative theory, under which these
misrepresentations will be actionable as misrepresentations of fact "if
they were intended and understood as such,"' the court stated:
[W]here the parties are in an equal bargaining position with equal
access to legal advice, there is no room for application of the
doctrine that misrepresentations of points of law will be considered
misrepresentations of fact if they were so intended and understood.
This is so because in such a situation the parties enjoy the
opportunity of making their own investigation and determination of
the legal effect of their actions 73
These principles were subsequently applied in Boggan v. Data
Systems Network Corp.174 and Gold Kist, Inc. v. Carr' 5 Boggan
involves a dispute arising from a sale of a business, in which both the
buyer and the seller were represented by counsel.'76 The purchase
agreement, as executed, allowed the purchaser to deduct from the
purchase price all inventory not sold or returned to vendors within 120
days of the closing."7 Prior drafts of the purchase agreement would
have allowed the purchaser to deduct only "obsolete" inventory."
After the closing, the purchaser sought to deduct from the purchase
price all inventory not sold within 120 days following the closing,
including inventory not formerly listed as "non-current" on the
target's financial statements.1 79 The seller alleged that, based on the
170. See id.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. Id
174. 969 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (construing Texas law).
175. 886 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1994).
176. See Boggan, 969 F.2d at 150-51.
177. See id. at 151.
178. See id. at 150-51.
179. See id. at 151.
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negotiations that resulted in the purchase agreement, the seller had
understood this purchase price adjustment to apply only to inventory
reflected on the financial statements of the target as "non-current"
inventory. 8 ' On this basis, among others, the seller alleged that the
buyer had committed fraud.181
The theory on which the case was submitted to the jury was limited
to one in which the buyer's statements were fraudulent, affirmative
statements of fact. 82 The case was not submitted on a theory that the
buyer made actionable statements of opinion."8 The appellate court
reversed a verdict in favor of the seller, limiting its analysis of the
fraud issue to theories under which the buyer's statements could be
construed as facts.184 As to the statements allegedly made by the
buyer's representatives during negotiations, the court cited two cases
categorizing statements regarding the legal effect of a document as
mere statements of opinion."8 In this context, the court stated:
To the extent that [the seller] understood, based on his discussions
with [the representative of the buyer], that the set-off would only
apply to 'non-current' inventory, his reliance on [the representative
of the buyer's] comments [was] misplaced: if anything, [those]
statements amounted to expressions of opinion, perhaps intent, but
certainly not fact.18 6
A similar result was reached in Gold Kist.' 7 The dispute giving rise
to the lawsuit arose from the sale of trucks and equipment for hauling
peanuts. 8' One component of the seller's business, Gold Kist, Inc.
("Gold Kist"), consisted of peanut shelling.18 9 Gold Kist contracted
for third parties to transport peanuts from various "buying points" to
its peanut shelling plant.1°
The original draft of the agreement for the truck and equipment
sale contemplated a collateral agreement that the purchaser would
have an exclusive right to transport peanuts for the seller within
Texas.191 After a preliminary understanding, subject to approval by
the seller's corporate headquarters, had been reached, it was reviewed
by more senior personnel at the seller's distant corporate
headquarters, who rejected the ancillary exclusivity provision.Yg2 A
180. See id. at 151, 153.
181. See id. at 151.
182. See id. at 152.
183. See id. at 154 n.4.
184. See id. at 150, 152, 154 n.4.
185. See id. at 154 n.4.
186. Id. at 154.
187. 886 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1994).
188. See id. at 428.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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revised form of the agreement was drafted at the corporate
headquarters, signed, and sent to the purchaser for signature,
providing in pertinent part, "Gold Kist, from time to time, may, but
shall be under no obligation to, engage you to haul commodities on its
behalf."193
Carr, the purchaser, testified that before he signed the agreement, a
representative of the seller described this provision as meaning that
the seller "did not have to use Carr if his performance did not meet
Gold Kist' [sic] expectations."'" The purchaser subsequently sued the
seller, alleging fraud, in addition to other claims. As to the fraud
claim, the court stated:
Carr did not contend that Gold Kist misrepresented the terms of the
written agreement.... There was no evidence that Carr was
induced by fraud to agree to the provision in the contract. At most,
the record establishes that [an employee of Gold Kist] made a
representation regarding the legal effect or interpretation of a
document which did not constitute fraud."95
The court ultimately reversed a jury verdict in favor of the
purchaser. 196
The court's explanation of its holding in Gold Kist is not entirely
clear. The reference to there being no evidence of fraudulent
inducement suggests that the court's decision was merely a product of
the plaintiffs failure to introduce adequate evidence to support his
case. But, considering this sentence together with the accompanying
language, the fair import of this part of the court's opinion is that
misrepresentations concerning the legal effect or interpretation of a
document cannot be the basis for a fraud claim. The purchaser, in the
court's view, failed to introduce evidence of fraudulent inducement,
because the evidence proved the existence of a fact pattern that is not,
as a matter of law, fraudulent inducement.
When contractual hostages are taken by the use of outright lies
about a contract provision's consequences, courts may resolve the
legal issues involved as they did in Boggan and Gold Kist. These two
cases address clear misstatements concerning the legal consequences
of the relevant documents and foreshadow the types of holdings that
can be expected of courts in these situations. The seizure of latent
contractual hostages will often involve a more subtle lie, such as one
of omission. Even in jurisdictions that do not follow Boggan and Gold
Kist, jurisdictions that would allow a claim of fraud in these factual
patterns, latent contractual hostages could nevertheless be
enforceable in many situations. Latent contractual hostages
193. Id. at 429.
194. ML (summarizing the alleged statement of a Gold Kist employee).
195. 1I at 430.
196. See id. at 428.
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frequently can be obtained without an outright lie concerning the
impact of the provision that creates the hostage. In some cases, the
impact of the provision may not be discussed at all. In other cases,
counsel seeking to take the hostage may identify a benign rationale
for the provision creating the hostage while failing to mention the
second impact, the one that actually creates the hostage. These
patterns of negotiation would be actionable in the courts that do not
follow Boggan and Gold Kist, or Doctor's Associates, only if these
omissions were considered fraudulent, and it would be difficult to
characterize them as such.
If the omission concerned a "basic assumption," the drafting lawyer
making this type of omission would have committed fraud if he knew
that opposing counsel was unaware of the second implication of the
contract provision." Hidden contractual hostages, however, are
unlikely to implicate "basic assumptions." Moreover, actual
knowledge, and not mere reason to believe, is required, 19 and careful
counsel seeking to seize a latent contractual hostage may not have the
requisite actual knowledge.
The Restatement also provides for reformation of a contract where
the drafter "knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake
of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing
or embodying an agreement in whole or in part."199  The
accompanying illustration, however, identifies a substantial mistake: a
seller mistakenly believes that a contract for the sale of property
incorporates the buyer's assumption of a mortgage.200 The relative
importance of the mistake addressed by the example suggests that the
type of contingencies frequently addressed latently by hidden
hostages are not covered by this provision.
The Restatement's categorization of "half-truths" as
misrepresentations is perhaps most on point.2a ' It provides:
A statement may be true with respect to the facts stated, but may
fail to include qualifying matter necessary to prevent the implication
of an assertion that is false with respect to other facts. For example,
a true statement that an event has recently occurred may carry the
false implication that the situation has not changed since its
occurrence. Such a half-truth may be as misleading as an assertion
that is wholly false.20
The illustrations, however, address circumstances where the
197. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b) (1981). Whether the
omission concerns a "fact" also could be disputed.
198. See id. § 161 cmts. d & e (identifying the potential availability of the defense of
mistake where the wrongdoer merely had reason to know of the mistake).
199. Id. § 161(c).
200. See id. § 161 cmt. e, illus. 12.
201. See id. § 159 cmt. b.
202. Id.
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omitted information undercuts the information conveyed.2' 3 The
seizure of a hidden contractual hostage need not necessarily involve
such a statement. For example, the drafting lawyer could, in response
to an inquiry concerning proposed language, describe one of the
possible implications of the language after saying, "Consider the
following fact pattern." The drafting lawyer could then identify the
application of the provision in question to that fact pattern. Any
complaint concerning the omission of other implications does not
undercut the truth of the statement asserted and thus is unlike the
illustrations.
These cases evidence a strong bias against granting a sophisticated
party relief from contractual provisions, under a theory of fraud, on
the basis that the other party failed to identify all the legal
consequences of the provisions. The above discussion identifies
significant authority upholding, in the face of fraud challenges,
negotiation tactics that are substantially more misleading, involving
outright falsehoods. The theory of fraud, then, does not present
substantial obstacles to the enforcement of latent contractual hostages
against sophisticated parties.2
E. Good Faith, Impracticability and Similar Defenses
A variety of additional doctrines afford courts the power to alter
the bargain expressly struck by the parties. They include defenses,
such as impracticability, mistake, and frustration, as well as the
doctrine of good faith.20 E. Allan Farnsworth has noted, "The cases
in which an adversely affected party has been allowed to avoid the
contract on this ground [of mutual mistake] are not marked by their
consistency in either reasoning or result."'  Application of the other
three principles to a fact pattern involving a hidden contractual
hostage is similarly murky.'
The historical application of these doctrines has been
fundamentally inconsistent, so an exhaustive review of the case law
and literature cannot accurately predict the extent to which these
203. See id. § 159 cmt. b, illus. 3, 4.
204. The result could substantially differ were the victim unsophisticated.
205. See Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 50 ("The impracticability, mistake, and
frustration doctrines permit courts to ignore contractual terms, but it commands them
to respect bargained-for allocations of risk.").
206. 2 Farnsworth, supra note 120, § 9.3.
207. Compare Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 46 (arguing these doctrines are
manifestations of a principle of "loss alignment" under which a party is relieved from
"a significant and unexpected loss under a contract when such relief would leave the
other party in a position no worse than she would have been in had the contract not
been made") with Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of
Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings LJ. 1, 5-6 (1991) (arguing that the cases suggest ajudicial principle of "inertia," in which courts leave the parties in their respective
positions).
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doctrines will prevent the realization of hidden contractual hostage
rights. Nevertheless, a review of a series of cases decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discloses some
relevant nuances in these doctrines.
The first case in the series is the controversial decision in Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank.2 8 This case involves a
bankruptcy court's equitable subordination of obligations under a
credit facility provided by First Bank of Whiting to Kham & Nate's
Shoes.2°9 First Bank of Whiting first loaned funds to the debtor in
1981.21°  By late 1983, the debtor had developed serious liquidity
problems and owed the bank $42,000.211 Additionally, the bank bore
contingent liability under letters of credit in favor of certain creditors
of Kham & Nate's Shoes.212
The bank and the debtor formulated a two-part solution to the
debtor's liquidity problems.213 The parties contemplated that a long-
term solution to the debtor's liquidity problems would be realized by
the debtor's obtaining a $1.2 million loan guaranteed by the Small
Business Administration.214  To address the debtor's financial
difficulties in the interim, pending resolution of the debtor's
negotiations with the Small Business Administration, the debtor
obtained a new $300,000 line of credit from the bank.215 The bank's
obligation to extend credit under this new line was conditioned on the
debtor's filing a bankruptcy petition and granting the bank a
"superpriority" lien, under 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1), on essentially all the
debtor's assets.21 6 The line of credit was subject to cancellation on five
days' notice.217
The debtor subsequently drew funds under the new line of credit.218
However, it did not secure the permanent, SBA-guaranteed
208. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition to the issues discussed in this
Article, Kham & Nate's Shoes also involved the "new value" principle under federal
bankruptcy law. This principle was the basis on which the district court confirmed a
plan of reorganization that allowed the debtor's principals to retain equity interests in
the debtor. See id. at 1353. The ongoing vitality of the "new value" principle is in
question. See generally Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St.
Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999) (reserving the question of whether there is a
new value exception).
209. See 908 F.2d at 1354.
210. See id. at 1353.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See First Bank v. Kham & Nate's Shoes, No. 2, Inc., 104 B.R. 909, 910 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (affirming the bankruptcy court's order to subordinate obligations of Kham
& Nate's Shoes), order vacated, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
215. See First Bank, 104 B.R. at 910.
216. See id.
217. See Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1353.
218. See id. at 1354.
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financing. 19 Approximately one month after the $300,000 line of
credit was signed, the bank notified the debtor that the line of credit
was being terminated.' The debtor subsequently proposed a new
plan of reorganization under which obligations to the bank would be
treated as unsecured." The bankruptcy court equitably subordinated
obligations owed to the bank and confirmed the plan.22-
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit examined whether the obligations owed to the bank should be
equitably subordinated, on the basis that the bank had either engaged
in "inequitable conduct" or violated its obligation to act in good
faith.' The court, in an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook,
vacated the order confirming the plan of reorganization, which
equitably subordinated extensions of credit under the $300,000 line of
credit. 4 The court noted that the obligation to act in good faith
"do[es] not block [the] use of terms that actually appear in the
contract."'
This fact pattern is similar to those in which parties may properly
seek to exercise latent hostage rights. The bankruptcy court found
that the bank would have been secure in making additional
advances. 6 When the bank decided to terminate the line of credit,
however, the debtor ultimately incurred substantial losses.rn If one
believes these findingsm the bank's actions in terminating the line of
credit resulted in little direct benefit to the bank while causing
substantial harm to the debtor, an outcome similar to the hallmarks of
an optimal hostage scenario.
This particular dispute did not involve a latent contractual hostage.
The debtor did not argue on appeal that it had been unaware of the
import of the contractual language allowing the bank to terminate the
line of credit. In fact, the court noted that the documents made the
bank's termination rights manifest; the contract stated, "[N]othing
provided herein shall constitute a waiver of the right of the Bank to
219. See First Bank, 104 B.RI at 911.
220. See Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1354.
221. See id
222. See id
223. See id. at 1357.
224. See id at 1363.
225. Id. at 1357.
226. See id- at 1358.
227. See First Bank v. Kham & Nate's Shoes, No. 2, Inc., 104 B.R. 909, 911 (N.D.
Ii. 1989).
228. The discussion in the appellate court's opinion of the absence of bad faith or
inequitable conduct suggests that some of the bankruptcy court's findings of fact are
not credible. The bankruptcy court found that the bank -would have been secure in
making additional advances." Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1358. The opinion at
the appellate level, however, states that the inability of the debtor to obtain financing
from any other source supports the view that the bank would not have been secure in
making additional advances. See id
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terminate financing at any time."2 9 Nor does the opinion suggest that
the bank sought to terminate the line of credit because the debtor was
engaging in improper conduct." Although this factual pattern did not
involve a latent contractual hostage, the court's discussion of the
principles of good faith is consistent with a more narrow
understanding of the implied covenant of good faith. Such an
understanding would be more accommodating of latent contractual
hostages. It discredits the view that the implied covenant of good
faith prevents one party from taking actions that seriously
disadvantage the other party but do not benefit itself.
The second case in the series, Market Street Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Frey,231 involves a dispute concerning the terms of a
commercial lease. A provision in the lease entitled the tenant to
"request Lessor ... to finance the costs and expenses of construction
of additional Improvements upon the Premises" in the amount of
$250,000 or more. 2 The lease further provided that if the parties
could not reach an agreement on the landlord's financing of the
improvements, the tenant would have the option to purchase the
property at a price specified by a formula set forth in the lease. 3 The
tenant requested financing for $2 million in improvements with an
oblique reference to the lease provisions addressing financing of
improvements.' The landlord declined to provide financing without
entering into negotiations, and the tenant subsequently sought to
exercise the purchase option set forth in the lease. 5 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the basis, inter
alia, that the tenant violated the duty of good faith. The tenant
appealed. 6
The opinion issued by the court of appeals quotes Kham & Nate's
Shoes for the proposition that the covenant of good faith prevents
opportunism in contract performance that could not have been
contemplated when the contract was formed.237 In reversing the
district court's award of summary judgment in favor of the landlord,
the court said:
We do not usually excuse contracting parties from failing to read
and understand the contents of their contract; and in the end what
229. Id. at 1353.
230. The bank's President indicated that the bank terminated the line of credit as a
result of a conflict between himself and the bank employee who arranged the line of
credit. See First Bank, 104 B.R. at 911.
231. 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 591.
233. See id.
234. See id. (indicating that one of two letters from the tenant requested a
discussion of "financing pursuant to the lease").
235. See id. at 591-92.
236. See id. at 592.
237. See id. at 595.
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this case comes down to... is that an immensely sophisticated
enterprise simply failed to read the contract. On the other hand,
such enterprises make mistakes just like the rest of us, and
deliberately to take advantage of your contracting partner's mistake
during the performance stage (for we are not talking about taking
advantage of superior knowledge at the formation stage) is a breach
of good faith. To be able to correct your contract partner's mistake
at zero cost to yourself, and decide not to do so, is a species of
opportunistic behavior that the parties would have expressly
forbidden in the contract had they foreseen it.- 8
The court further distinguished actions taken during the negotiation
of a contract, noting, "The formation or negotiation stage is
precontractual, and here the duty is minimized. It is greater not only
at the performance but also at the enforcement stage, which is also
postcontractual."2 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
subsequently addressed the duty of good faith in Original Great
American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd."'
This case arose from a dispute between a franchisor and a franchisee
over the operation of a cookie store.2"4 The franchisor terminated the
franchise on the basis, inter alia, that the franchisee had been
delinquent in making payments.242 In a discussion regarding the
franchisee's failure to demonstrate the franchisor's violation of the
covenant of good faith, the court noted that the franchisor had offered
to allow the franchisee to assign the franchise. That offer could
indicate that the franchisor was not seeking to appropriate value
properly belonging to the franchisee.243
These later cases also reflect a construction of the implied covenant
of good faith that is more favorably inclined toward enforcing latent
contractual hostages. The emphasis noted above2" in Market Street
Associates on the increase in the scope of the obligation to act in good
faith, arising as the parties pass from the contract negotiation phase to
the performance phase, suggests a greater willingness to enforce
hidden contractual hostages, which are created before the duty of
good faith increases. In Great American Cookie Co., the reference to
the franchisor's lack of direct benefit from terminating the franchise
supports the conclusion that the franchisor did not violate its
obligation to act in good faith.2 5 This reference suggests a sensitivity
to issues relevant to enforcing the preferred types of hostages-those
238. Id. at 597.
239. Id at 595.
240. 970 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
241. See id at 275.
242. See id. at 278.
243. See id at 280.
244. See supra notes 231-36 and accompanying text.
245. See 970 F.2d at 280.
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that do not create incentives for the holder of the hostage to act
opportunistically.
It should be noted, however, that none of these cases directly
addresses the enforceability of a latent contractual hostage.
Moreover, the hostage may be used to restrain opportunism in a
situation entirely unrelated to the contract term giving rise to the
hostage.246 There is some support for the position that it is bad faith to
exercise a contractual right for a purpose entirely divorced from the
putative purpose of the right.247  In jurisdictions following that
principle, there would be substantial limits on the enforceability of
hidden contractual hostages.
F. Conclusions
Some of the doctrines discussed in this Part have nuances that
facilitate the creation of latent contractual hostages. The impact of
other doctrines is to prevent the creation of latent contractual
hostages, particularly the preferred latent contractual hostages that do
not induce second order or consequential opportunism by the hostage
taker. It is not easy to assess quantitatively the efficiency of these
preventative doctrines, as applied to highly negotiated and
documented commercial transactions, compared with the alternative
doctrines that increase the enforceability of latent contractual
hostages.
In other contexts, a similar assessment can be made if one of the
two alternatives can be shown to have a negative or zero value and the
other alternative is shown to have a positive value. A principle that
contracts should be construed "reasonably" seems defensible in that
fashion. A cursory inspection yields no benefits to construing
contracts unreasonably. In some contexts, there are certainly benefits
to adopting a reasonable construction of a contract, even if the
construction is not as consistent with the actual language used as an
"unreasonable" alternative construction. But if a closer inspection
indicates that there are some circumstances where the "unreasonable"
construction produces superior results, identifying the more efficient
legal principle becomes much more complex. Because the judiciary is
not well-equipped to make the requisite empirical inquiry, even if the
question could be practicably resolved, the determination is more an
246. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
247. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations,
68 Cornell L. Rev. 617, 622 (1983) ("[C]ourts may find bad faith where a party that is
unharmed by the breach of an express clause uses the breach as a pretext for ceasing
performance and entering into a more attractive alternate deal."). But see Oak Mill
Enters. 2000, Inc. v. Knopfler (In re Schraiber), 141 B.R. 1000, 1005-06 (holding, in a
case citing Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1990), and Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991),
that such an exercise of a condition does not constitute bad faith).
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exercise in judgment, i.e. decisionmaking in the absence of sufficient
data or a rigorous decisionmaking algorithm.2
V. IMPACT ON LAWYER COMPETENCE
Part IV discussed the impact of various principles of contract law on
the ability of lawyers to take hidden hostages. The failure to adopt
principles of contract law that allow lawyers representing
sophisticated parties in negotiated transactions to take hidden
hostages can have a perverse impact on the type of representation
ultimately obtained by clients. This Part discusses that impact.
Transactional lawyers use contract provisions to allocate risks. One
way in which lawyers add value is by identifying potential risks. For
example, a lawyer negotiating the terms of senior debt on behalf of
the senior creditor can add value by pointing out that the value of the
senior debt can be adversely affected if the debtor can incur
subordinated indebtedness maturing before the senior debt.
Of course, a lawyer can bring excessive zeal to this activity,
ensnaring the negotiations with an overwhelming array of issues to be
resolved. One of the obligations of counsel in a transaction is to
exercise judgment in limiting the points that need to be addressed in
negotiations. But the fact that transactional lawyers are not perfect in
their exercise of this judgment does not eliminate the value arising
from the identification and discussion of proper issues.29
Just as a transactional lawyer will exercise discretion in raising legal
issues, a transactional lawyer will exercise discretion in taking hidden
hostages as well. Attempts to take excessive numbers of hidden
hostages may result in the identification of the hostages and an
adverse effect on the tenor of negotiations. A prudent lawyer will
assess the likelihood of potential problems and respond with a
balanced strategy, addressing some issues directly in negotiations and
others with hidden hostages, as the context requires.
But if the hostages are not enforceable, there is no incentive for a
client to hire a lawyer who can properly make that assessment. A
diminution of the value that can be realized from identifying issues
decreases the extent to which market forces will reward lawyers who
are able to identify potential risks in advance. A natural consequence
of that result is a decrease in the extent to which clients are apprised
of risks that should cause transactions not to proceed.
248. Cf Gergen, Defense, supra note 35, at 98 (stating that the relative costs and
benefits of defenses excusing performance cannot be assessed).
249. See Painter, supra note 94, at 544 (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, describing the
transactional lawyer as a "creative agent" crafting contracts -%vith privileges or
safeguards till then unknown to the business world" (quoting Sullivan & Cromwell, A
Century at Law 15 (1979))).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Lawyers add value to transactions by creating relationships that
minimize transaction costs 0  At times, actions that appear
"unreasonable" in the negotiation of commercial relationships, such
as the taking of hidden hostages, can actually be reasonable. Those
apparently unreasonable actions can increase joint transaction value
by decreasing opportunism.
One natural consequence of this value-adding method is that
lawyers incur reputations for being unreasonable. They act as a
reputation "sink," deflecting reputational consequences for certain
actions from their clients.
Marc Galanter has identified four categories of complaints against
lawyers: "[L]awyers are (1) corrupters of discourse; (2) fomenters of
strife; (3) betrayers of trust; or (4) economic predators.""1 Although
this Article has not attempted to address all the bases for the adverse
reputation that lawyers have garnered, for example lawyers' betrayals
of clients' trust, it does address a significant source of the adverse
reputation of lawyers.
In addition to articulating an intellectual salve for the wound to the
collective self-image of lawyers inflicted by popular perceptions, this
Article provides some modest insights into principles of contract
construction and principles providing defenses to the enforcement of
contracts. The actions that result in lawyers taking hidden hostages
can produce contractual rights, not knowingly assented to by all the
parties, that increase the possibility of opportunism. It is not at all
clear that a court could apply the relevant defenses to contract
enforcement and principles of contract construction in a fashion that
would limit enforcement of latent contractual hostages to those that
are beneficial. However, the possible joint benefit arising from
hidden contractual hostages suggests that greater circumspection is
required before a court should decline to enforce facially
unreasonable, highly negotiated contract provisions against a
sophisticated party.
250. See Gilson, supra note 18, at 312-13.
251. See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice,
28 Ga. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1994).
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